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ABSTRACT 
The objective of the present research was to explore the number of 
accidents and near misses that occur in New Zealand organisations, the proportion 
of these incidents that are reported, and the factors influence that their reporting.  
Most of the research in the area of incident reporting, underreporting and promoting 
reporting has used qualitative analysis, asking participants to discuss the barriers 
to reporting incidents.  By applying decision making theories to incident reporting, 
a framework was created for assessing previous research, as well as collecting 
data on factors that influence employee’s decisions to reporting incidents.   
A sample of 689 participants took part in the study by completing a 26-item 
questionnaire.  Twelve New Zealand organisations, two providing health services, 
three involved in power supply, four involved in construction, two supplying heavy 
machinery and equipment and one government department, provided a sample of 
employees that was representative of their business to complete the questionnaire.  
Where practical organisations provided a copy of their current incident form, so that 
differences in incident form design could be compared to questionnaire answers.  
On average, the participants in the present research reported experiencing 
3.61 incidents annually, and reported 86.1% of the incidents they experienced.  
Based on the differences in organisation incident and reporting rates, the present 
research has supported the conclusion that incident reporting is associated with 
lower incident rates (Phimister et al., 2000; Reason, 1990, Storgard et al., 2012).   
The key factors associated with increased incident reporting were training 
on what and how to report an incident, confidence in one’s understanding of the 
reporting process, incident form usability, and whether the time estimated to 
complete an incident form was perceived as reasonable.  All of positive, negative 
and practical reasons for reporting or not reporting incidents that were presented 
to participants were found to be important to employees.  It appears that the 
combination of these factors influence incident reporting.  However, overall positive 
reasons were rated the most important, followed by practical, and negative 
reasons. 
The present research has expanded the knowledge and understanding of 
employee perceptions of incident reporting.  If an organisation would like to 
promote incident reporting in their workplace, an organisation specific approach is 
required.  However, key actions include ensuring that all employees are trained in 
what and how to report an incident, and ensuring that their incident form is quick 
and easy to use.  When considering the incident form, the design and usability 
ii 
should be reviewed from an employee perspective.  An organisation could also 
review how the positive, negative and practical reasons discussed in the present 
research could be motivating or deterring incident reporting in their workplace. 
There are five key areas of interest that future research could address.  
These areas are the content of training and its impact on incident reporting, 
different elements of incident form design and their impact on incident reporting, 
how factors combine and interact to influence decisions to report incidents, whether 
the number of incidents experienced and reported differ across organisations, 
industries and countries, and the effect of accountability and individual 
responsibility on safety.
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CHAPTER 1:  
Introduction 
“No one goes to work expecting to suffer injury or die, yet the grim truth is 
that far too many Kiwis experience harm – be it acute, chronic or catastrophic” 
(Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety, 2013, p.4).  For every 
serious incident, at least twenty-nine less serious incidents occur (Hendrick, 1959).  
Therefore, in the ideal world, every accident and near miss would be reported, 
investigated and actions taken to improve safety and prevent future incidents.  
However, the sheer number of workplace injuries and fatalities indicates that there 
is a flaw in the system.  Despite the theoretical benefits that arise from incident 
reporting, in reality underreporting or high rates of employees not reporting 
incidents is an issue across a wide range of industries (Kongsvik, Fenstad, & 
Wendelborg, 2012).  The present research explored the incident rate in New 
Zealand organisations, the reporting rate in New Zealand organisations and the 
factors that influence employee decisions of whether or not to report an incident. 
 
Incidents 
Each year in New Zealand, over 200,000 occupational injuries result in 
ACC claims, and over 100 of work-related incidents will be fatal (Ministry of 
Business, Innovation and Employment, 2014).  This number is high when 
compared Australia, where in 2010-2011, there were 132,570 workers 
compensation claims for serious work related injuries (Safe Work Australia, 2014).  
Additionally, New Zealand has a high workplace fatality rate, with approximately 4 
deaths per 100,000 employees.  Again, this is significantly higher than Australia’s 
estimate of approximately 1.99 deaths per 100,000 workers (Safe Work Australia, 
2014).  
Businesses are required to report serious incidents to the Ministry of 
Business and Innovation (Health and Safety in Employment Act, 1992).  However, 
the workplace incident rate in New Zealand is difficult to obtain (Independent 
Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety, 2013).  These difficulties occur from 
differences in definitions on incident, and practical difficulties in measuring and 
obtaining an accurate record of the number of incidents that occur.  In an attempt 
to overcome this and provide an incident rate estimate, the Independent Taskforce 
on Workplace Health and Safety, (2013) explored how many serious incidents 
occur on a weekly basis.  This was achieved by reviewing news reports distributed 
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locally and nationally.  In the first week of December 2012 there were five deaths, 
eight people with injuries that required hospital treatment, six livestock euthanized 
and a potential gas explosion averted.  This suggests that the weekly incident rate 
of serious incidents is high across New Zealand workplaces.  However, there is a 
need to determine the actual rates of serious and minor incidents. 
For an individual business, Safety Management Group (2015) suggest that 
the expected annual incident rate can be calculated by the formula (total number 
of injuries and illnesses from previous year x 200,000) / number of hours worked 
by all employees.  Based on this calculation, in the United Sates private sector the 
incident rate for 2007 was 4.2 cases per 100 employees. This declined from 4.4 
cases per 100 employees in 2006 (Bureau of Labour Statistics, 2008).  Incident 
rates (rate per 100 employees) were broken down into various industries with an 
incident rate of 4.4 cases for natural resources and mining, 5.4 for construction, 
5.6 for manufacturing, 4.9 for trade, transport and utilities, 2.0 for information/media 
services, 1.4 for financial activities, 2.1 for professional and business services, 5.2 
for education and health services, 4.5 for leisure and hospitality and 3.1 for other 
services (Bureau of Labour Statistics, 2008).   
As the present research addressed perceptions of incident reporting, it was 
important to define an incident, and account for common perceptions and 
definitions of the word incident.  To consider a common definition, the New Zealand 
Oxford Dictionary (2005, para. 1) defines incident as “a minor or detached event 
attracting the general attention or noteworthy in some way”.  Additionally, “The 
noun incident is frequently used in the mass media to denote an action for 
occurrence that has or is likely to have serious, violent, or political consequences” 
(Good Word Guide, 2007, para. 1).  Academic definitions usually take a broader 
perspective, such as an event or circumstance which could have or did cause harm 
to anyone or which resulted in a complaint, loss or damage (Handler et al., 2007).  
For the purposes of the Cooper (1978, p 277) study on anesthesia incidents, a 
critical incident was defined as “an occurrence that could have led (if not discovered 
or corrected in time) or did lead to an undesirable outcome, ranging from increased 
length of hospital stay to death or permanent disability”.   
The differences between common or dictionary definitions and academic 
definitions are the inclusion of near misses.   A near miss is defined as an incident 
that leaves no injuries, property or equipment damage, and may leave little or no 
evidence that the incident occurred.  These are often referred to as narrow escapes 
(Reason, Hollnagel & Paries, 2006).  An accident is defined as an event that results 
in injury and loss, environmental impact and/or significant downtime of production 
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processes.  These events are often obvious and brought to the attention of 
management (Phimister et al., 2003).  This distinction between near misses and 
accidents is the severity of the incident.  The present research intended to include 
both near misses and accidents.  Therefore an incident is defined as an event or 
circumstance which could have or did cause harm to anyone, or an event which 
resulted in a compliant, loss or damage (Handler et al., 2007). 
Even the smallest hazard can result in an incident, which could have a 
significant impact on an employee, cause pain or serious injury, and may drastically 
affect the livelihood of that employee (Ministry of Business and Innovation, 2014).  
Additionally, where incidents are fatal, this is devastating for friends and family of 
the employee involved in the incident.  This harm from involvement in an incident 
is unquantifiable.  It can take the form of financial, psychological and/or physical 
harm for the employee, other staff or customers involved (Ahluwalia & Marriott, 
2005, Hrymak et al., 2007).  
At an organisational level, an incident can have serious negative 
consequences, especially for a small business (Ministry of Business and 
Innovation, 2014).  The costs of an incident are high.  In the United States, it is 
estimated that the annual cost of preventable adverse incidents is between $17 
billion and $29 billion dollars (Thomas et al., 1999).  Employer costs occur through 
a wide range of factors.   
Costs associated with attending to the incident can include production and 
productivity losses, repair for damaged equipment, litigation costs and personal 
compensation costs for medical and travel expenses and loss of salary (Ahluwalia 
& Marriott, 2005; Hrymak et al., 2007, Ministry of Business, Innovation & 
Employment, 2014).  To continue operating the business, an organisations 
expenses can include salaries for replacement staff, retraining costs, and costs 
resulting from increasing supervision in the workplace, (Hrymak et al., 2007).  
Furthermore, an incident can have long term consequences such as increases in 
insurance premiums, resentment from employees, and potential damage to the 
organisations reputation (Hrymak et al., 2007).  As incidents can have a negative 
impact on both the individuals and organisations involved, it is important to consider 
what actions can be taken to promote incidents being reported, and prevent 
incidents.   
 
Incident Reporting 
Learning from previous incidents is important to improve safety (Di Lieto 
2012; Kjellen, 2000; Prang & Jelsness-Jorgensen, 2014).  Di Lieto (2012) 
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suggested that to improve safety regulations, an analysis of both how errors occur 
and how errors fail to be corrected is required.  A workplace culture of safety is 
driven by a learning culture, where organisations actively seek out previous 
experiences of error so they can ensure the incident is not repeated.  Hendrick 
(1959) suggested that for every serious incident, at least twenty-nine less serious 
incidents occur.  Phimister et al., (2003) expanded this and suggested that for every 
serious injury, there may be 10 minor injuries, 60 incidents with property damage 
or loss, 600 incidents without damage or loss, and numerous unsafe hazards or 
conditions.  Voluntary reporting of these less serious incidents can provide 
important information that cannot be obtained by other means (Adams, 2005). 
Incident reporting provides insight into the factors that contributed to an incident 
(Reason, 1990).  Upon analysis an investigator can view how these factors could 
interact with other aspects of the system to cause future incidents.  Storgard et al., 
(2012) found that higher rates of incident reporting are associated with improved 
safety.  For this reason, incident reporting is a well-accepted practice in a range of 
industries and is recognised as a method for improving safety (Anderson et al., 
2013).   
The reporting method known as the Critical Incident Technique began in 
the aviation industry and was first described in 1954 (Flanagan, 1954).  Since then, 
a wide range of organisations in numerous industries, and a number of government 
authorities have implemented a critical incident reporting process or system.   
Incident reporting processes, policies and systems vary across organisations and 
industries (Anderson et al., 2013, Wagner et al., 2013), but they share a common 
goal to enable learning through a reporting culture (Waring, 2004).  The key step 
of a reporting system requires employees to routinely document and communicate 
their experiences (Waring, 2004).   Incidents are then collated and analysed 
(Ahluwalia & Marriott, 2005).   
The investigation of a critical incident has several aims which include 
identifying the relevant human and system causative factors, assessing current 
and future risk, identifying key learning and possible improvements, and meeting 
any local or mandatory reporting requirements.  The key questions asked are ‘what 
could go wrong?’, ‘how badly could it go wrong?’, and ‘what needs to be done to 
prevent it going wrong?’ (Spath, 2003).  Some form of feedback to employees, the 
organisation and relevant stakeholders usually follows an investigation. This 
feedback could take the form of discussions at regular multidisciplinary and/or 
departmental meetings, paper-based or electronic newsletters or bulletins, 
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postings on departmental or organisational websites, and targeted campaigns 
related to particular incidents or patterns of incidents (Spath, 2003).   
In New Zealand, neither legislation nor the government authority, the 
Ministry of Business and Innovation specify how incidents should be recorded and 
processed.  However, to be compliant with the Health and Safety in Employment 
Act (1992), employers are required to manage hazards before incidents occur, 
keep an up-to-date register of all workplace accidents and near misses, report all 
serious harm accidents to the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment 
using the Ministry’s supplied incident form, investigate all incidents, and keep 
copies of all incident reports and investigations (Ministry of Business, Innovation & 
Employment, 2014).  One possible system suggested by the Ministry of Business, 
Innovation and Employment is to record all incidents (not just the serious harm 
incidents) on the Ministry’s incident form and keep copies in an accident register.  
This reporting system can then lead into active hazard management, investigating 
all accidents and near misses to identify hazards, and review how hazards can be 
managed through isolation, minimization or elimination. 
If incident reporting is considered using systems theory, each incident 
report provides feedback on the current system and can be used as a means to 
assess and improve system performance (Mitchell, 2008).  Each incident report is 
analogous to a medical “biopsy”, providing a sample of the system.  Through 
collation and analysis of incidents over a period of time, and potentially over 
multiple sites and organisations, a comprehensive representation of current 
practices, knowledge and attitudes at different levels of the organisation can be 
built and evaluated (Anderson et al., 2013; Webb et al., 1993).   
There are multiple advantages associated with incident reporting.  These 
include eliciting contextual details about the contributing factors of incidents, 
assisting the monitoring of underlying trends and patterns that increase the 
likelihood of  incidents, promoting employees to suggest corrective strategies, 
allowing timely investigations to take place, promoting comprehensive recording of 
incidents which can assist if legal cases arise, and promoting feedback of accurate 
information to the parties involved (Ahluwalia & Marriott, 2005; Anderson et al., 
2013; Webb et al., 1993).  Additionally, when near misses are reported, this 
reduces the possibility of an outcome bias, which can arise from only incidents that 
caused serious impact or harm being reported (Webb et al., 1993).  Jones, 
Kirchsteiger and Bjerke (1999) found a 60% reduction in lost time injuries occurring 
offshore and a 75% reduction in lost time injuries onshore as a result of increased 
incident reporting.  Additionally, Anderson et al., (2013) found that most staff 
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perceived incident reporting had a positive impact as it led to changes in processes, 
but also to changes in staff attitudes and knowledge.  
 
Underreporting 
Underreporting is defined as a ratio of the number of incidents an employee 
reports to an organisation, compared to the number of incidents experienced by an 
employee (Probst & Estrada, 2010).  Low reporting rates result in a lack of 
awareness and understanding of the actual incident rates, and the number of daily 
errors that occur in the workplace (Kohn, Corrigan & Donaldson, 2000).   
Underreporting is an issue across a wide range of industries (Kongsvik, et al., 
2012). As a result, it is likely that only a fraction of incidents are reported (Webb et 
al., 1993).  Psarros, Skjong and Eide (2010) estimated that 59-79 percent of 
incidents on marine tanker vessels were not reported.  Other researchers 
estimated that voluntary reporting systems capture only ten percent of workplace 
incidents (Barach & Small, 2000; Jones et al., 2004).  Hazell and Shakir (2006) 
considered underreporting of adverse drug reactions in a range of hospitals and 
departments.  The average underreporting rate was 94 percent, with an 
interquartile range of 82-98 percent.  The underreporting rates ranged from 6-100 
percent. In another study, Probst, Brubaker, and Barsotti, (2008) found that 78 
percent of workplace accidents were not reported.   
Probst and Estrada, (2000) considered how many accidents employees 
experienced and how many accidents they reported, and found that 54.2 percent 
of employees reported experiencing but not reporting an incident.  On average, for 
every accident reported to an organisation, 2.48 accidents were not reported 
(Probst & Estrada, 2000).  Phimsister et al., (2000) considered 19 different 
corporate sites and found that annual incident reports per person ranged between 
0-0.3 for eight businesses, between 0.3 and 1 for four businesses and seven 
businesses had a disclosure rate higher than 1.   
Research suggests there are multiple reasons why incidents are not 
reported, and the problem of underreporting most likely stems from a complex mix 
of these factors (Prang & Jelsness-Jorgensen, 2014).  Lack of awareness or 
recognition that an incident has occurred is acknowledged as a barrier to reporting 
incidents (Wakefield et al., 1995; Wakefield et al., 1999).  The ability to notice 
incidents is influenced by the work environment where the incident occurs, and 
employee cognitive ability (Wagner, Castle & Handler, 2013).  However, lack of 
awareness is distinctly different from actively deciding not to report an incident.  
Probst, Barbaraneli, and Petitta (2013) found that various factors motivate or deter 
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incident reporting.  This suggests that when an incident occurs, first awareness of 
the incident is required, then a decision to report the incident.  Researchers have 
identified a need for further research into the motivational elements incident 
reporting (Holden & Karsh 2007; Karsh et al., 2006; Wakefield et al., 1999). 
 
Decision Making Models 
A range of decision making models have been applied to incident reporting 
in an attempt to understand how employees may make the decision to report an 
incident.  Either there are rules or heuristics that govern the decision of whether to 
report an incident, or reasons for reporting, and reasons against reporting are 
evaluated (Tversky & Shafir, 1992).  Under Error Management Theory employees 
will conduct cost benefit analysis and consider the positive and negative outcomes 
(Johnson et al., 2013) that could result from reporting and not reporting an incident.  
Luce and Weber ‘s (1968) conjoint expected risk theory suggests employees will 
then estimate the probability of the expected outcomes, and estimate whether the 
outcome is likely to be positive or negative.   
Under rank dependent theories, employees will give a weight and value to 
each of these factors, and the positive and negative outcomes that could occur 
(Birnbaum et al., 1992; Birnbaum, Thompson & Bean, 1997; Birnbaum & Beeghley, 
1997; Birnbaum & McIntosh, 1996; Birnbaum & Viera, 1997; Mellers, Schwartz & 
Cooke, 1998). Figure 1 displays a diagram of the integration of these theories, 
indicating the process employees could take at a conscious or subconscious level 
when deciding whether to report an incident.   
 
Incident 
occurs
A need to 
decide 
whether to 
report the 
incident
Possible 
postitive 
outcomes 
identified
Each positive 
outcome given a 
weighting based on 
their probaility of 
occuring and their 
perceived importance
Calculation:
Postive Outcomes 
(combined weights of 
positve otucomes) 
minus
Negative Outcomes 
(combined weights of 
negative outcomes)
Incident 
Reported
(postive 
outcomes 
outweighed 
negative 
outcomes)
Incident Not 
Reported
(negative 
outcomes 
outweigh 
positive 
outcomes)
Possible 
negative 
outcomes 
identified
Each negative 
outcome given a 
weighting based on 
their probaility of 
occuring and their 
perceived importance
Figure 1: Suggested process for deciding whether to report an incident. 
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First an incident occurs and the employee becomes aware of the incident. 
The decision to report an incident is structured by first using Error Management 
Theory (Johnson et al., 2013) and breaking the decision down into an analysis of 
the positive and negative outcomes.  Luce and Weber’s (1968) conjoint expected 
risk theory and rank dependent theories (Birnbaum et al., 1992; Birnbaum, 
Thompson & Bean, 1997; Birnbaum & Beeghley, 1997; Birnbaum & McIntosh, 
1996; Birnbaum & Viera, 1997; Mellers, Schwartz & Cooke, 1998) have been 
integrated as it is suggested that the evaluation of the specific negative and positive 
outcomes is conducted by giving a weight to each outcome based on the probability 
(conjoint expected risk theory), and perceived importance (rank dependent theory) 
of that outcome.   
Moving back into Error Management theory (Johnson et al., 2013), the 
positive and negative outcomes are grouped together and whether the combined 
weight of positive reasons outweighs the negative reasons is evaluated.  If the 
combined weight of the positive outcomes is higher than the combined weight of 
the negative outcomes, the incident will be reported.  If the combined weight of the 
negative outcomes is higher than the positive outcomes, the incident will not be 
reported.  This framework was created to assist in evaluating previous research 
and to provide the framework for categorising research into the motivators and 
deterrents of incident reporting.   
 
Specific Factors That Influence Underreporting 
Most of the research in the area of incident reporting, underreporting and 
promoting reporting has used qualitative analysis, asking participants to discuss 
the barriers to reporting incidents.  In reference to reason based choice (Tversky & 
Shafir, 1992), this type of questioning has essentially asked participants to share 
their stories about reporting incidents.  Reasons can take the form of stories, or 
lists of pros and cons (Mellers, et al., 1998).  Therefore, the factors found in 
previous research to influence decisions to report, were converted to a list of pros 
and cons to remain consistent with the framework that was created for evaluating 
and categorising previous research (discussed above).   
 
Positive Reasons.  Positive reasons are defined as positive outcomes that 
motivate employees to report an incident.  These reasons represent the positive 
outcomes and factors that are considered when deciding whether to report an 
incident.  Previous research in this area has mostly focused on what hinders 
reporting, with the notion of barriers to reporting well established within the 
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literature (Pfeiffer, Manser & Wehner, 2010).  However, when taking a broader 
approach as suggested by Pfeiffer et al., (2010), some of the barriers mentioned 
represent a different side of the coin, and the opposite shows the motivators and 
positive reasons for reporting incidents.  For example, statements such as “never 
heard feedback on quality improvement projects arising from reports” (Pfeiffer et 
al., 2010, p.7) are often discussed as lack of feedback hindering reporting.  
However, when the positive side is viewed, this indicates feedback could be 
motivating reporting.    In this situation the action of giving feedback motivates 
reporting, and the inactive form of not giving feedback deters reporting.  Factors 
are categorised based on the active form of the factor, and positive reasons 
represent motivators to reporting incidents and negative reasons represent factors 
that hinder reporting. 
Reporting will make a difference.  Previous research has indicated that 
whether incident reporting is perceived to make a difference influences decisions 
to report (Beasley, Escoto & Karsh, 2004; Coyle et al, 2005; Evans et al, 2006; Jeffe 
et al., 2004; Kingston et al, 2004; Merchant & Gully, 2005; Pfeiffer et al., 2010; 
Schectman & Plews- Ogan, 2006; Taylor et al., 2004; Uribe et al., 2002; Vincent et 
al., 1999; Waring, 2005; Wu et al., 2008).  This difference can take the form of the 
problem being fixed (Storgard et al., 2012; van der Schaaf & Kanse, 2004), 
reporting resulting in a change (Wagner, Capezuti & Ouslander, 2006), or the 
organisation learning from the incident (Jeffe et al., 2004; Pfeiffer et al., 2010; van 
der Schaaf & Kanse, 2004; Wild & Bradley, 2005).   
When health and safety personnel were perceived to already know about 
the problem (Wagner et al., 2013), or were perceived to be incompetent (Beasley 
et al., 2004; Schectman & Plews-Ogan, 2006; Waring, 2005), employees were 
deterred from reporting. This implies health and safety personnel follow up actions 
influence the perception of whether incident reporting makes a difference.   
Wagner et al., (2013) found that employees were more likely to report 
infrequent rather than frequent events, and other researchers have found that 
employees believed harmless errors were not worth reporting (Chiang et al., 2010; 
Kessler et al., 2011).  In the health sector the outcome of the incident, for example 
whether a patient is harmed, influenced whether incidents were reported (Evans et 
al., 2006; Karsh et al., 2006; Merchant & Gully, 2005; Schectman & Plews-Ogan, 
2006; Taylor et al., 2004; Uribe et al., 2002; Vincent et al., 1999; Wakefield et al., 
1996; Wakefield et al., 1999; Wild & Bradley, 2005).  This suggests that employees 
are filtering the type of incidents they report.  This filtering could be based upon 
whether they perceive that reporting will make a difference. 
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Feedback.  A number of researchers have found that feedback is important 
to the decision to report an incident (Beasley et al., 2004; Chiang et al., 2010; Coles 
et al.,2001; Coyle et al., 2005; Evans et al., 2006; Garbutt et al., 2008; Handler et 
al., 2007; Jeffe et al., 2004; Kingston et al., 2004; Mahajan, 2010; Schectman & 
Plews-Ogan, 2006; Storgard, et al., 2012; Wagner et al., 2012; Walsh, Burns & 
Antony, 2010).  Additionally, the amount of feedback given on earlier incident 
reports influences incident reporting rates (Kongsvik et al., 2012).    Prang & 
Jelsness-Jorgensen (2004) found that nurses felt feedback was important as it 
provided solutions and enhanced understanding of how to approach similar 
situations in future.   
Probst & Estrada (2010) found that whether employees perceive 
management had responded to the incident was important.  This supports the 
conclusion feedback is important.  Been et al., (2009) suggest that feedback to 
staff about incidents and the actions taken is crucial to the learning cycle of a health 
and safety system, and Gandhi et al., (2005) state feedback is a key feature for 
creating a culture of safety awareness. 
A supportive environment.  Wu et al., (2008) found that the expectation 
of others and the norms of an organisation influence reporting.  Additionally, 
whether organisations and their staff encourage employees to report incidents can 
motivate or deter reporting (Braithwaite et al., 2008; Coyle et al., 2005; Prang & 
Jelsness-Jorgensen, 2004; Vincent et al., 1999).  Brondino, Silva & Pasini (2012) 
found that both supervisors and colleague’s play a significant role in safety climate.   
Zohar and Luria (2005) suggested that the policies and procedural actions 
of management and the everyday practices of the supervisor set the standard of 
behavior expected by employees.  Kongsvik et al., (2012) found that the captain of 
a ship heavily influenced the degree of health and safety compliance on board.  
Additionally, supervisors’ and managers’ attitudes and reactions to incident reports 
have been found to influence incident reporting in numerous studies (Mayo and 
Duncan, 2004; Prang & Jelsness-Jorgensen, 2004; Williamsen, 2013). 
Whether colleagues support an employee’s decision to report an incident 
has been found to influence decisions to report (Chiang et al., 2010; Evans et al., 
2006; Prang & Jelsness-Jorgensen, 2004; Storgard et al., 2012; van der Schaaf & 
Kanse, 2004; Vincent et al., 1999; Wagner et al., 2006).  Colleagues can offer 
additional information, show behavioral support for desired practices and 
discourage others, and may offer additional forms of mentoring.  When compared 
to supervisors, colleagues had the most influence and impact on the safety climate 
of an organisation (Brondino et al., 2012).     
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Negative Reasons. The present research defined negative reasons as 
negative outcomes that prevent employees from reporting an incident.  When 
reviewing the literature, a conceptual difference between some of the negative 
reasons exists.  This difference arises out of the nature of the outcomes, and how 
business could resolve these reasons or factors in the workplace.  A large number 
of the negative reasons would need to be addressed by considering the culture of 
an organisation, or actions taken after the incident is reported.  For example, 
concerns about being blamed (Pfeiffer et al., 2010) could be reviewed by 
considering whether there is a blame culture in the organisation, and ensuring 
employees are not blamed during incident investigations.  
In contrast, there are a number of practical reasons identified in research.  
For example, these factors include an inappropriate form, lack of time and not 
knowing where to find an incident form (Pfeiffer et al., 2010).  These factors directly 
affect the person reporting, at the time of reporting the incident.  To address these 
problems in workplace an employer could make the reporting process easier, less 
time consuming, and more accessible.  Because negative and practical reasons 
are conceptually different they will be discussed separately. 
Fear of being blamed.  Chiang et al., (2010, p.23) found that people “see 
errors as personal responsibility and defects in work performance”.  This 
perception implies that when reporting an incident, it is believed someone is at 
fault.  Fear of being blamed for an incident discourages incident reporting (Beasley 
et al., 2004; Evans et al., 2006; Garbutt et al., 2008; Jeffe et al., 2004; Karsh et al., 
2006; Kingston et al., 2004; Probst & Estrada, 2010; Schectman & Plews-Ogan, 
2006; Vincent et al., 1999; Wagner et al., 2013; Wakefield et al., 1996; Wakefield 
et al., 1999; Wild & Bradley, 2005).  Additionally, Chiang et al., (2010) and Waring 
(2005) refer to the “blame culture” of the hospital affecting the rate of reporting.  
Furthermore, research suggests employees hold concerns about how their incident 
report could affect others, with concerns about blaming others acting as a barrier 
to incident reporting (Chiang et al., 2010; Kingston et al., 2004; Prang & Jelsness-
Jorgensen, 2004; Schectman & Plews-Ogan, 2006; Taylor et al., 2004; Uribe et al., 
2002). 
According to the attribution bias (Kelley, 1967), when people experience a 
positive outcome they will attribute the success to internal factors, and negative 
outcomes will be attributed to external factors.  In comparison, when other people 
experience positive outcomes or success this is attributed to external factors, and 
when negative outcomes occur these are attributed to internal factors (Kelley, 
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1967).  For example, if one’s sports team wins a game, the result is attributed to 
superior skills and their teamwork.  However, if one’s sports team loses a game, 
the result is attributed to bad weather, key players being away or sick, or other 
factors beyond their control, ignoring the other team’s abilities.   
Therefore, it is not surprising that society is constructed in a manner that 
promotes finding a person to be blamed and punished for negative outcomes or 
accidents.  Media uses terms like driver error, pilot error and human error to create 
juicy stories, our legal system seeks to apportion blame in order to make 
appropriate settlements, and health and safety professionals can get caught 
arguing for the case of an employer and apportioning blame to the injured 
employee (Robotham, 2014).  Additionally, articles promoting the need for 
individual accountability and responsibility can be found in the health and safety 
training resources (Regulatory Training Centre, 2014).  Theoretically, the fear of 
being blamed could be enhanced if strong attitudes of individual accountability exist 
within an organisation.   
Fear of negative career outcomes.  Previous research has found that fear 
discourages incident reporting.  These include fears that employment will be 
directly affected through negative performance appraisal (Adams, 2005; Chiang et 
al., 2010; Probst & Estrada, 2010; Waring, 2005), disciplinary actions, or 
punishments (Wagner et al., 2006; Lubomski et al., 2004; Probst & Estrada, 2010; 
Wagner et al., 2013, Walsh, et al., 2010), or termination of employment (Probst et 
al., 2013).   
Additionally, this includes fears that could indirectly affect employment 
through tarnishing ones reputation, reducing the ability to gain references (Waring, 
2005), facing challenges to professional credibility (Chiang et al., 2010), or having 
their competence questioned (Allsop & Mulcahy, 1998; Coyle et al., 2005; Kingston 
et al., 2004; Schectman & Plews-Ogan, 2006; Taylor et al., 2004; Wakefield et al., 
1996; Wakefield et al., 1999; Waring, 2005). 
These concerns can also occur at an organisational level, with concerns 
about ruining company “no accident” records or “safe employee” perceptions, 
found to be important (Probst et al., 2013; Waring, 2005).  Furthermore, fear of 
legal liability or lawsuits has also been reported as a barrier to incident reporting in 
multiple studies (Beasley et al., 2004; Evans et al., 2006; Jeffe et al., 2004; 
Kingston et al., 2004; Merchant & Gully, 2005; Schectman & Plews-Ogan, 2006; 
Uribe et al., 2002; Wagner et al., 2006; 2013; Waring, 2005). 
Fear of colleague reactions.  The importance of a supportive environment 
has being discussed as a positive reason.  However, lack of support also takes the 
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active form of criticism or teasing from colleagues, with embarrassment (van der 
Schaaf & Kanse, 2004), humiliation from peers (Wagner et al., 2006), verbal 
bullying and exclusion from social settings (Jackson et al., 2010; Prang & Jelsness-
Jorgensen, 2004) found to act as barriers to incident reporting.  Several studies 
have indicated that nurses have been deterred from reporting incidents based on 
previous reporting experiences that resulted in anxiety, depression and social 
exclusion (Braubacher et al., 2011; Jackson et al., 2010; Jackson et al., 2010; 
Jackson et al., 2011; Mountzogou, 2010; Peters et al., 2011). 
Fear of uncertainty.  Chiang et al., (2010) found that fear of uncertainty is 
a barrier to incident reporting.  Hsu et al., (2005) found that in uncertain situations 
the brain acknowledges a decision must be made while information is missing, and 
attempts to overcome this by seeking the relevant information.  If this information 
is not available, subjective probabilities of ambiguous events are made.  Therefore, 
the decision to report an incident is likely to be influenced by the amount of 
information people know about the reporting and investigation processes and the 
outcomes that could follow incident reporting.  Hsu et al., (2005) suggested that 
this decision would also be affected by how ignorant people feel compared to 
others, suggesting employee’s confidence in their knowledge could be a relevant 
factor. 
 
Practical Reasons.  Practical reasons are defined as conditions that make 
reporting impractical or difficult and as a result prevent employees from reporting 
an incident.  Chiang et al., (2010) discussed the burden of reporting.  This burden 
takes different forms and occurs as a result of the practical barriers an employee 
must overcome to report an incident.  
Time.  Incident reporting is often considered too time consuming (Coyle et 
al.; 2005, Evans et al.; 2006, Garbutt et al.; 2008, Handler et al.; 2007, Jeffe et al.; 
2004, Kessler et al.; 2007, Merchant & Gully 2005; Prang & Jelsness-Jorgensen 
2004; Schectman & Plews-Ogan, 2006; van der Schaaf and Kanse, 2004; Uribe et 
al., 2002; Vincent et al., 1999; Wakefield et al., 1996; Wakefield et al., 1999).  
Reporting an incident is perceived as additional to an employee’s workload rather 
than neatly integrated into a day’s work (Beasley et al., 2004; Coyle et al., 2005; 
Karsh et al., 2006; Uribe et al., 2002; Vincent et al., 1999; Wu et al., 2008).  
Additionally, difficult work conditions (van der Schaaf & Kanse, 2004), and external 
demands and tasks (Kongsvik et al., 2012) limit the time available to report 
incidents.  Flanagan (1954) found that the longer the time lapse between an 
incidents occurring and incidents being reported, was associated with less 
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mundane incidents reported.  This filtering of incidents has been supported by 
research (Prang & Jelsness-Jorgensen, 2004).   
Inadequate reporting systems.  Research indicates flaws and 
practicalities in reporting systems or process, can affect incident reporting rates 
(Prang & Jelsness-Jorgensen, 2004; Wagner et al., 2013).  Lack of adequate 
reporting systems deter reporting (Wagner et al., 2013; Walsh et al., 2010).  In 
support of this, a preference for an alternative reporting system, can reduce 
incident reporting (Evans et al., 2006; Schectman & Plews-Ogan, 2006; Vincent et 
al., 1999).  Alternative systems can be as simple as discussing the issue with the 
relevant stakeholders, sending an email, or mentioning the issue to the manager. 
Incident forms.  Whether or not the incident form is immediately available 
can influence reporting (Webb et al., 1993).  Additionally, incident forms that are 
difficult to use, too complicated, require too many details, or are perceived as not 
appropriate or relevant discourage incident reporting (Beasley et al., 2004; Coles 
et al., 2001; Evans et al., 2006; Braithwaite et al., 2008; Karsh et al., 2006; Kingston 
et al., 2004; Merchant & Gully, 2005; Schectman & Plews-Ogan, 2006; Taylor et 
al., 2004; Uribe et al., 2002).  Form medium can affect influence reporting 
(Ammenwerth et al., 2003; Prang & Jelsness-Jorgensen, 2004).  Ammenwerth et 
al., (2013) found that some employees expressed wishes to be able to report on 
paper-based systems and stated they reported less incidents after new electronic 
reporting systems were implemented.  This preference for paper incident forms 
was a result of lack of confidence using electronic systems. 
Lack of knowledge.  Firstly, to report an incident, employees need to be 
aware that an incident reporting system exists (Vincent et al., 1999; Wild & Bradley, 
2005).  Additionally, a lack of understanding of what to report, where to report and 
how to report, are found to limit incident reporting (Beasley et al., 2004; Evans et 
al., 2006; Jeffe et al., 2004; Kingston et al., 2004; Merchant & Gully, 2005; Prang 
& Jelsness-Jorgensen, 2004; Probst & Estrada, 2010; Schectman & Plews-Ogan, 
2006; Taylor et al., 2004; Uribe et al., 2002; Vincent et al., 1999; Wakefield et al., 
1999; Wakefield et al., 1996; Walsh et al., 2010; Waring, 2005; Wild & Bradley 
2005).  Confusion over what to report can refer to how severe incidents should be, 
to warrant reporting (Prang & Jelsness-Jorgensen, 2004; Malmedal, Hammervold 
& Saveman, 2009).  Furthermore, Coles et al., (2001) found that uncertainty about 
the purpose of reporting influenced reporting rates. 
Employee perceptions.  Employee beliefs that incident reporting is not 
part of their job, are found to reduce incident reporting (Evans et al., 2006; 
Merchant & Gully, 2005; Schectman & Plews-Ogan, 2006; Taylor et al., 2004; 
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Vincent et al., 1999; Waring, 2005).  Additionally, this belief can be accompanied 
with the perception that accidents are just part of the job (Waring, 2005), which is 
particularly apparent in high-risk industries (van der Schaaf & Kanse, 2004).  These 
perceptions can deter reporting.  Furthermore, not liking paperwork, or perceiving 
paperwork as not part of the job hinders incident reporting (Antonsen, 2009; 
Waring, 2005). 
 
The Present Research 
The present research expands the knowledge and understanding about 
incident reporting; in particular, employee perceptions of incident reporting. This 
allows the present research to provide information that could assist businesses in 
deciding the best strategies for increasing incident reporting rates, and therefore 
increasing safety (Storgard et al., 2012).  This was achieved by addressing the 
following research questions. 
 
1. What is the Incident Rate in New Zealand organisations?   
The available statistics suggest New Zealand incident rates are high 
(Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety, 2013).  However, it is 
possible these statistics only represent severe incidents, therefore underestimating 
the incident rate in workplaces.  Therefore, there is a need to explore and establish 
an estimate of the incident rate of both severe and minor incidents in New Zealand 
workplaces. 
 
2. What is the Reporting Rate in New Zealand organisations?   
Numerous studies have found that underreporting incidents is an issue 
(Hazell & Shakir, 2006; Probst et al., 2008; Probst & Estrada, 2010; Psarros et al., 
2010).   Incident rates were expected to vary across organisations, industries and 
countries.  Therefore, the present research explored whether underreporting is an 
issue in New Zealand, and to what extent.  Additionally, the present research 
explored the reporting rate in a range of New Zealand businesses and compared 
these estimates to incident rates found in other research. 
 
3. What Factors Influence an Employee’s Decision to Report an Incident?   
As discussed above, a wide range of factors influence employee decisions 
to report incidents.  The perceptions of a number of positive, negative and practical 
reasons were explored and their relationship with incident reporting evaluated. 
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Overall importance ratings.  Overall ratings of the importance of positive 
reasons, negative reasons and practical reasons were measured.  When Error 
Management Theory (Johnson et al., 2013) is applied to incident reporting, the 
decision to report an incident is essentially the sum of positive reasons, minus 
negative reasons, minus practical reasons.  If the sum is positive, the incident will 
be reported as the positive reasons were outweighing the negative and practical 
reasons.  If the sum is negative, the incident will not be reported as either the 
negative or practical reasons were outweighing the positive reasons.  As 
underreporting is a problem in a wide number of industries (Kongsvik, et al., 2012) 
and underreporting estimates range from approximately 50-90 percent (Hazell & 
Shakir, 2006; Probst et al., 2008; Probst & Estrada, 2010; Psarros et al., 2010).  
This suggests that either the negative reasons or practical reasons were 
outweighing the positive reasons, and were therefore seen to be the most 
important.   
Additionally, common sense suggests people make time for something, and 
will overcome practical barriers if they perceive something to be important and 
worthwhile.  Numerous research states lack of time is a barrier to incident reporting 
(Coyle et al., 2005; Evans et al., 2006; Garbutt et al., 2008; Handler et al., 2007; 
Jeffe et al., 2004; Kessler et al., 2007; Merchant & Gully, 2005; Prang & Jelsness-
Jorgensen, 2004; Schectman & Plews-Ogan, 2006; van der Schaaf & Kanse, 2004; 
Uribe et al., 2002; Vincent et al., 1999; Wakefield et al., 1996; Wakefield et al., 
1999).  Based on the assumption that people would overcome the barrier of time if 
they perceived reporting to be important, positive reasons were not perceived 
important enough to make time to report incidents.   
The effects of the positive reasons often occur after the investigation 
process has taken place.  Mellers et al., (1998) found that when an outcome is 
delayed in time, the value of the outcome may be reduced or discounted, and 
people often select an inferior option now rather than the superior option later.  This 
could be influencing the perceived value of the positive reasons.  This finding is 
supported by Kahenman & Tversky’s (1979) choice behavior research.  Therefore, 
it is hypothesised that either or both negative and practical reasons will be more 
important than positive reasons. 
H1. Either or both negative and practical reasons will be perceived as 
more important than positive reasons. 
 
The relative importance of positive, negative and practical reasons.  
Three lists of reasons representing factors that influenced decisions to report 
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incidents were derived from research, so the relative importance could be 
evaluated.  Eight positive reasons, eleven negative reasons and eight practical 
reasons were identified.  Participants were given the three lists, asked to select the 
five most important positive, negative and practical reasons and rank these in order 
of importance.  No hypotheses were made about which reasons will be perceived 
as the most important. 
 
Accountability.  In addition to the list of negative reasons, perceptions of 
accountability were explored.  Chiang et al., (2010, p.23) found that people “see 
errors as personal responsibility and defects in work performance”.  This 
perception implies when reporting an incident, it is believed someone is at fault.  
Robotham, (2014) suggests society is constructed in a manner that promotes 
finding a person to be blamed and punished for negative occurrences such as 
accidents.  Additionally, articles promoting the need for individual accountability 
and responsibility can be found in the health and safety training resources 
(Regulatory Training Centre, 2014).  The present research explored whether a 
belief for individual accountability and responsibility exists in New Zealand 
organisations.  As these perceptions could enhance fears of negative outcomes, it 
was expected that accountability perceptions would have a relationship with 
negative outcomes, in particular fear of being blamed. 
H2. Perceptions of a need for individual accountability and responsibility 
will have a positive relationship with overall importance ratings 
negative outcomes. 
H3. Perceptions of a need for individual accountability and responsibility 
will have a positive relationship with fear of being blamed. 
 
Additional practical reasons. A range of practical reasons were explored 
in further detail to expand the knowledge on how they could be influencing incident 
reporting. 
Lack of knowledge.  A lack of understanding of what to report, where to 
report and how to report, were found to reduce incident reporting. (Beasley et al., 
2004; Evans et al., 2006; Jeffe et al., 2004; Kingston et al., 2004; Merchant & Gully, 
2005; Prang & Jelsness-Jorgensen, 2004; Probst & Estrada, 2010; Schectman & 
Plews-Ogan, 2006; Taylor et al., 2004; Uribe et al., 2002; Vincent et al., 1999; 
Wakefield et al., 1996; Wakefield et al., 1999; Walsh et al., 2010; Waring, 2005; 
Wild & Bradley 2005).   
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The amount of information missing and how ignorant people feel can 
influence a decision.  When information is missing; people will make decisions 
based on subjective probabilities of ambiguous outcomes occurring (Hsu et al., 
2005).  If employees clearly understand the steps of the process, the amount of 
information missing is reduced.  Therefore, the amount of accommodation for 
possible negative outcomes is expected to reduce.   
The level of participant knowledge and understanding of the reporting 
process was explored.  Additionally, how confident participants were in their 
understanding of the reporting process was explored.  It was hypothesised that 
both an increased knowledge and understanding of the reporting process, and 
perceived confidence in one’s understanding, would have a positive relationship 
with incident reporting.   
H4. Knowledge and understanding of the reporting process will be 
associated with increased incident reporting.  
H5. Perceived confidence in understanding of the reporting process will 
be associated with increased incident reporting. 
Factors that impact the level of knowledge of reporting process.  A 
number of factors were expected to influence incident reporting, by affecting the 
level of knowledge of incident reporting and incident reporting processes.  Health 
and safety training, or specific incident reporting training is expected to cover what 
and how to report an incident.  Therefore training is expected to be associated with 
increased knowledge and increased incident reporting.   Additionally, whether 
information about the follow up stages of the reporting process was provided on 
the incident form was measured.  This was also expected to be associated with 
increased knowledge and increased incident reporting. 
H6. Training will be associated with increased knowledge and 
understanding of the reporting process. 
H7. Training will be associated with increased incident reporting. 
H8. Information provided on the incident form about the incident reporting 
process will be associated with increased knowledge and 
understanding of the reporting process. 
H9. Information provided on the incident form about the incident reporting 
process will be associated with increased incident reporting. 
Time.  Participants perceptions of the time estimated to complete an 
incident form were explored.  Lack of time has been found to deter incident 
reporting in numerous research (Coyle et al., 2005; Evans et al., 2006; Garbutt et 
al., 2008; Handler et al., 2007; Jeffe et al., 2004; Kessler et al., 2007; Merchant & 
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Gully 2005; Prang & Jelsness-Jorgensen 2004; Schectman & Plews-Ogan, 2006; 
van der Schaaf and Kanse, 2004; Uribe et al., 2002; Vincent et al., 1999; Wakefield 
et al., 1996; Wakefield et al., 1999).  Therefore, it is hypothesised that incident 
reporting will have a negative relationship the time required to complete an incident 
form. 
H10. Incident reporting will have a negative relationship with the amount 
of time estimated to complete an incident form. 
Incident form design features.  Incident form design features have been 
found to influence incident reporting (Beasley et al., 2004; Braithwaite et al., 2008; 
Coles et al., 2001; Evans et al., 2006; Karsh et al., 2006; Kingston et al., 2004; 
Merchant & Gully, 2005; Schectman & Plews-Ogan, 2006; Taylor et al., 2004; Uribe 
et al., 2002).  The incident form design features of form medium (whether incident 
forms were paper or electronic), and question style (whether multiple choice 
questions were included) were explored.  Additionally, whether any relationships 
with incident reporting were explored.  No hypotheses about possible relationships 
were made.   
Incident form usability.  Incident forms that were too complicated or 
confusing and require too many details hinder incident reporting (Beasley et al., 
2004; Braithwaite et al., 2008; Coles et al., 2001; Evans et al., 2006; , Karsh et al., 
2006; Kingston et al., 2004; Merchant & Gully, 2005; Schectman & Plews-Ogan, 
2006; Taylor et al., 2004; Uribe et al., 2002).  Perceptions of incident form usability 
were measured.  It was hypothesised that when incident forms were perceived as 
easy to use, incident reporting would be increased.  Additionally, incident forms 
that were easier to use were expected to take less time to complete. 
H11. Incident form usability will have a positive relationship with incident 
reporting. 
H12. Incident form usability will have a negative relationship with the 
amount of time estimated to complete an incident form. 
Demographic information. The demographic information of gender, 
whether employees were engaged in full time or part time work, whether 
participants were employees, supervisors, health and safety personnel or business 
owners, age, tenure and organisation were collected. These variables were 
primarily collected to describe the sample.  However, relationships between the 
demographic variables and other variables were explored to evaluate whether 
differences participant perceptions or incident reporting existed. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were selected through their employment in one of the 
organisations that opted to be involved in the study.  Organisations were 
approached through email, cold calling, networking, and safety orientated groups 
that operate in the New Zealand framework.  This included postings to social media 
through the New Zealand Institute of Safety Management (2012) LinkedIn page 
and emails sent through the Safeguard OSH Solutions forum (Thomas Reuters 
New Zealand Limited, 2014). 
Twelve organisations were involved in the present research.  Two 
organisations provide health services, three involved in power supply, four involved 
in construction, two equipment supply services and one a government department.  
Organisations were asked to provide a sample of employees that were 
representative of their business to complete a questionnaire.  Organisations were 
told the ideal participants were frontline employees and/or employees that hold the 
highest probability of experiencing incidents.  However, selection of the sample of 
employees for each business was dependent on the organisation.  This meant the 
sample and selection of employees from each business was varied. 
689 participants participated in the survey.  They were employed by a New 
Zealand organisation, and were working in New Zealand at the time they 
participated in the survey.  Due to drop out rates, and some participants choosing 
not to answer demographic information, there were some missing values when 
discussing demographic variables.   Of the 510 participants (74.02% of all 
participants) who indicated their gender, 245 participants were male and 265 
participants were female.  509 participants (73.88% of all participants) indicated 
their employment classification.  444 were employed on a full time basis and 65 
were employed on a part time basis.  385 participants identified themselves as 
employees, 93 identified themselves as supervisors and 31 participants identified 
themselves as health and safety advisors or managers, or business owners, and 
180 participants chose not to answer this question.  Only 470 participants (68.21% 
of all participants) indicated their age, participants ages ranged from 19-68, with 
an average age of 43.  Of the 503 employees that mentioned their tenure with their 
current organisation, the average time was 8.77 years with a range of 0.25 to 42.5 
years.   
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Questionnaire distribution was tailored to each organisation and their 
business needs.  This meant a range of distribution methods were implemented.   
For paper based questionnaires, this included walking around business requesting 
employees’ complete surveys, distributing during health and safety training, and 
surveys being printed by organisations or posted to organisations and being 
distributed by health and safety managers.  For surveys completed through the 
online survey software (Qualtrics, 2014), a link to the survey was either emailed to 
participants or posted on electronic communication boards. 
This impacted response rates, and the ability to determine response rates 
for all organisations.  The average response rate was 78.42%.  For individual 
organisations response rates ranged from 44.1% to 100% of surveys completed 
and returned.  For three organisations the distribution and collection of surveys was 
completely controlled by the organisation and response rate could not be 
determined. 
 
Materials 
All participants were completed a 26-item questionnaire, which was created 
for the purpose of the present research.  It measured incident rates, incident 
reporting rates, and a selection of positive, negative and practical reasons 
identified in previous research to influence employee decisions to report incidents.  
Additionally, where practical organisations provided copies of their incident forms.  
Form medium, question style, and whether information was provided about the 
follow up stages of reporting incidents were evaluated.  This research was granted 
ethical approval by University of Waikato Research an Ethics Committee of the 
School of Psychology and the questionnaire is presented in Appendix 1.   
 
Measures 
The incident and reporting rates in New Zealand organisations.  In 
order to address the first two research questions, incident rate and incident 
reporting rates were measured.  Hayes and colleagues (1998) measured incident 
reporting rate by asking employees how many safety accidents they had 
experienced and reported to company officials, and how many safety accidents 
they had experienced and not reported to company officials over the past 12 
months.   This was adapted by Probst & Estrada (2010), and was further adapted 
to measure incident rates and incident reporting rates in this study.  
Incident rate was measured by asking participants how many incidents, 
accidents, close calls or near misses they had experienced over the past twelve 
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months.  Participants were then asked how many accidents, close calls or near 
misses they had reported in the last twelve months.  These terms were expected 
to be common terms used in the workplace.  The reporting ratio was calculated by 
comparing the number of incidents reported with the number of incidents 
experienced.  However, this variable does not account for participants that had 
experienced zero incidents, which gave them no opportunity to report.  Therefore, 
participants that experienced zero incidents were excluded from reporting ratio 
analysis. 
 
The factors that influence employee decisions to report incidents.  
Eight positive reasons, 11 negative reasons and 8 practical reasons (see Table 1) 
identified in literature to influence decisions to report incidents were presented to 
participants.  
 
Table 1: The positive, negative and practical reasons measured in this research. 
Positive reasons Negative Reasons Practical Reasons 
1. Reporting will result in 
the problem being fixed 
1. Concerned I might be 
blamed for the incident 
1. Lack of time due to high 
work demands or time 
pressures 
2. The organisation will 
learn from my incident 
report 
2. Concerned about 
negative performance 
appraisal 
2. Lack of time due to 
difficult working 
conditions 
3. Improvements or 
changes will occur as a 
result of my incident 
report 
3. Concerns of disciplinary 
actions or other 
punishments 
3. Not liking paperwork 
4. Knowing my supervisor 
will support my decision 
4. Worried about tarnishing 
company records 
4. Paperwork is not part of 
my job 
5. Knowing my colleagues 
will support my decision 
5. Concerned I could be 
seen as incompetent 
5. Not having an adequate 
reporting system 
6. Knowing management 
will read my report and 
find it useful 
6. Concerns about my 
reputation or 
professional credibility 
6. Not knowing what to 
report 
7. Receiving written 
feedback on my incident 
report 
7. Concerns about legal 
liability or actions 
7. Not knowing where or 
how to report 
8. Receiving verbal 
feedback on my incident 
report 
8. Not knowing how the 
incident report will be 
used 
8. A difficult or impractical 
incident form 
 9. Not knowing who is 
responsible for the 
incident 
 
 10. Concerned I could be 
criticised or teased by 
my supervisor 
 
 11. Concerned I could be 
criticised or teased by 
my colleagues 
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 For each of the three lists of reasons, participants were asked to select the 
five reasons they perceived as the most important when deciding whether or not to 
report an incident, and rank these in order of importance.  Next participants were 
asked to consider the three lists as three groups of reasons.  Participants rated the 
overall importance of positive, negative and practical reasons on a six-point rating 
scale that ranged from not at all important to very important.  Additionally, 
participants were asked whether there were any other positive, negative and 
practical reasons not mentioned on the lists that influenced their decision to report 
an incident. 
 
Additional Questions.  To expand the knowledge in this area, additional 
questions were added to explore accountability perceptions, the level of knowledge 
and understanding of the reporting process, whether training has occurred, the 
perceptions of the time associated with completing an incident form, the usability 
of incident forms, and a range of incident form design features.  
  Accountability.  To measure accountability perceptions, participants 
rated on a 6-point Likert scale, how strongly they agreed or disagreed with the 
statement “I believe an individual should be held accountable after a major 
accident”. 
Understanding and knowledge of the reporting process.  Participant 
understanding and knowledge of the reporting process was measured by 
requesting participants list the process of reporting an incident for their 
organisation.  A seven-step framework was created to assess and compare 
understanding of the reporting process.  Each answer was evaluated for whether 
they mentioned the following steps: initial management of incident, finding the 
incident form, completing the incident form, handing in the incident form, 
investigation of the incident, corrective actions taken, and feedback given.  These 
steps did not need to be mentioned in order, or use the same wording, but needed 
to suggest each step to be counted as being included in an individual answer.  
Where the lack of a step was written down, for example ‘don’t hear any feedback’, 
this was counted as mentioning the step, in this example feedback.  This enabled 
an overall understanding of reporting process to be computed.  This calculation 
was the number of steps mentioned, divided by seven, the number of possible 
steps.   
In order to limit biases affecting the data, three raters coded the answers.  
The Cronbach’s Alpha was calculated to measure the agreement between raters.  
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As the Cronbach’s Alpha statistic of 0.911 is above 0.80, this indicates a good level 
of reliability and consistency between raters (Field, 2009). 
Additionally, participants were asked to rate on a six point Likert scale, 
whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement “I am confident in my 
understanding of the incident reporting process”.  This provided a measure of 
perceived confidence in understanding of the reporting process.   
Training.  Training was measured by inquiring whether participants had 
received training on what and how to report an incident. 
Time.  Participants were asked three questions in regards to their 
perceptions of the time associated with completing incident forms.  Firstly, 
participants were asked to provide an estimate of the time they expect it to take to 
complete an incident form for their current organisaiton.  Secondly, participants 
answered whether they perceived their estimated time to be reasonable.  If 
participants perceived the time they estimate to complete their incident form as 
unreasonable, they provided a time they perceived was reasonable. 
Incident form usability.  The usability of the incident forms used by 
organisations involved in the present research was assessed.  This was achieved 
by asking participants to rate how easy the incident form is for their organisation 
on a six point rating scale ranging from very difficult to very easy. 
Incident form design features.  Three incident form design features were 
measured, these were from medium, question style, and whether the incident form 
provided information on the follow up stages.  Form medium was a binomial 
variable and whether incidents forms were paper or electronic based was recorded. 
 In reference to the questions used in incident forms, very little differences 
were clearly identifiable.  Most incident forms were one page long, and there was 
not much variation in the number of questions asked.  One difference was question 
style.  Forms were classified into two categories, using multiple choice questions 
or only open ended questions.  If an incident form had at least one question, with 
at least ten multiple choice options, it was classified as using multiple choice 
questions.   
Additionally, whether information was provided on the incident form about 
the follow up stages of reporting was evaluated.  If any information about the follow 
up stages of the reporting process was provided on the incident form, it was 
categorised as providing information.  This included sections for supervisors or 
health and safety personnel to complete. 
Demographic Information. The demographic variables of gender, 
employment classification, age, tenure and organisation were measured to 
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describe the sample.  However, relationships were variables were explored to 
evaluate whether participants perceptions differed.  Employment classification 
referred to whether employees were full time or part time employees and measured 
employment level.  Employment level was initially classified into four levels; a) 
employees, b) supervisors, c) health and safety advisors or mangers, d) business 
owners.  Participants were requested to select the most relevant category.  Due to 
the small sample size of business owners, health and safety personnel and 
business owners were combined for analysis. 
  
   
32 
CHAPTER 3:  
Results 
Results are organised and described by the three research questions 
addressing; incident rate, reporting rate, and the factors that influence an 
employee’s decision to report an incident. 
 
1. What is the Incident Rate in New Zealand organisations?   
On average, the participants in this study experienced 3.61 (SD = 8.59) 
incidents, accidents, near misses or close calls over a 12 month period.  The 
present research explored whether incident rates differed between demographic 
groups.  However, incident rate estimates demonstrated skewness, as the statistic 
of 7.23 was higher than 2.58, and demonstrated kurtosis, as the statistic of 68.3 
was higher than 3.29 (Field, 2009).  Therefore, the assumption of normality was 
violated.  To overcome this, non-parametric tests were conducted to explore 
differences and relationships. 
A Kruskal-Wallis test revealed organisations differed in the number of 
incidents experienced, H(11, 634) = 44.45, ρ < .001.  These differences are 
displayed in Figure 2.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The number of incidents experienced by each organisation.  Horizontal line 
is the overall mean and vertical lines indicate the 95% confidence interval. 
   
33 
Six organisations had confidence intervals below the mean, suggesting a 
lower risk of incidents occurring.  These were categroised as ‘low risk 
organisations’, and the remaining 6 organisations were categorised as ‘high risk 
organisations’.  A Mann-Whitney test confirmed this difference was significant, 
finding low risk organisations experienced fewer incidents (Mdn = 1.00) than high 
risk organisaitons (Mdn = 2.00), U = 32634, ρ < .001.  This classification was used 
in later analysis to explore whether incident rate demonstrated a relationship with 
reporting rate, and whether participants from low risk organisations perceived 
factors that influence decisions to report incidents differently. The purpose of this 
exploration was to provide insight into factors that could be influencing this 
difference in incident rate. 
A Mann-Whitney test indicated that females experienced more incidents 
(Mdn = 2.00), than males (Mdn = 1.00), U = 24822, ρ = .018.  As gender differences 
were unexpected, the ratio of males to females per organisation was explored.  
Seven organisations were predominantly male and 4 organisations were 
predominantly female.  A Chi-Square test revealed a significant relationship 
between organisation and gender, χ²(11, 509) = 284, ρ < .001.  Therefore, as 
genders were not evenly distributed across organisations, the differences between 
organistaions could bias this result.  Consequently, the present research cannot 
determine whether gender differences actually exist, so gender was not explored 
or discussed further. 
A Mann-Whitney test indicated no difference between the incident rates of 
full time and part time employees, U = 11464, ρ = .32.  Additionally, a Kruskal-
Wallis test found no difference between employment level (employee, supervisor, 
health and safety personnel or business owner) incident rates, H(2, 475) = 2.00, ρ 
= 0.37.  Spearman’s correlation tests found no relationships with age, r(441) = -
.091, ρ =.055, or tenure r(468) = -.064, ρ =.17 
 
2. What is the Reporting Rate in New Zealand organisations?   
When the number of incidents, accidents, near misses or close calls which 
participants reported was compared with the number of incidents experienced, the 
mean reporting ratio was 0.86 (SD = 1.71).  This indicated that approximately 
86.1% of incidents were reported, leaving an underreporting rate of 13.9%.  This 
variable demonstrated skewness and kurtosis, violating the assumption of 
normality, requiring non-parametric tests to analyse relationships. 
A Kruskal-Wallis test indicated that organisations differed in their reporting 
ratios H(11, 424) = 30.61, ρ < .001).  When categorised into low (mean incident 
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rate < 3.61) and high (mean incident rate > 3.61) risk organisations, a Mann-
Whitney test revealed low risk organisations have higher reporting ratios (Mdn = 
1.00), when compared to high risk organisations (Mdn = 0.80), U = 14484, ρ = .006. 
When considering employment classification, a Mann-Whitney test 
indicated that full time employees had higher reporting ratios (Mdn = 1.00), than 
part time employees (Mdn = .50), U = 3642, ρ = .004.  However, a Kruskal-Wallis 
test revealed no differences between employment level (employees, supervisors, 
health and safety personnel or business owners) reporting ratios, H(2, 316) = 1.52, 
ρ = .47.  Additionally, Spearman’s correlation tests found no relationships with age, 
r(296) =.033, ρ = .58 or tenure r(315) =.021, ρ = .71. 
 
3. What Factors Influence an Employee’s Decision to Report an Incident?  
A number of positive, negative and practical reasons that could influence 
employee’s decisions to report were explored.  Additionally, whether relationships 
existed with incident reporting ratio were evaluated through multiple analysis of 
covariance tests. This test allowed for the inclusion of control variables, and did not 
rely on the assumption of a normal distribution.  As this test required multiple 
dependent variables, the number of incidents experienced and the number of 
incidents reported were included as the reporting ratio was derived from these 
measures.  Additionally, as relationships were demonstrated with organisation, 
gender and employment type (full time, part time), these were included as within-
subjects factors.  However, these were excluded in the models evaluating the 
relationship with reporting ratio as they needed to be controlled for but were not 
the variable of interest. 
 
The relative importance of positive, negative and practical reasons.  
The present research explored the relative importance of eight positive reasons, 
eleven negative reasons and eight practical reasons that previous research 
indicated influenced incident reporting.  Participants were presented three lists of 
reasons (positive, negative and practical reasons).  For each list, participants 
selected the five reasons they perceived as most important, and ranked these in 
order of importance.  Wilcoxon sign ranked tests were conducted to evaluate 
whether the differences in rankings were significant.  This analysis, along with the 
mean ranks is attached in Appendix 2.   
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The positive reasons in order of importance were:  
1. Reporting will result in the problem being fixed 
2. Improvements or changes will occur as a result of my incident report  
3. The organisation will learn from my incident report 
4. Knowing management will read my report and find it useful 
5. = Knowing my supervisor will support my decision 
= Receiving written feedback on my incident report 
7. = Knowing my colleagues will support my decision 
= Receiving verbal feedback on my incident report 
 
The negative reasons in order of importance were: 
1. Concerned I might be blamed for the incident  
2. = Concerned I could be seen as incompetent 
= Concerns of disciplinary actions or other punishments  
= Concerns about my reputation or professional credibility 
= Concerns about legal liability or actions 
= Not knowing how the incident report will be used 
7. = Not knowing who is responsible for the incident 
= Concerns about negative performance appraisal 
9. = Worried about tarnishing company records 
= Concerned I could be criticised or teased by my colleagues 
= Concerned I could be criticised or teased by my supervisor 
 
The practical reasons in order of importance were: 
1. Lack of time due to high work demands or time pressures 
2. Lack of time due to difficult working conditions 
3. Not knowing what to report 
4. A difficult or impractical incident form 
5. = Not having an adequate reporting system 
= Not knowing where or how to report 
= Not liking paperwork 
8. Paperwork is not part of my job 
 
All positive, negative and practical reasons presented to participants were 
ranked as important.  Therefore all of these reasons were perceived by some 
participants to influence their decisions to report incidents.  However, when 
relationships with incident reporting ratio were explored, of the 27 reasons 
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presented to participants, only 2 demonstrated relationships with the incident 
reporting ratio.  As the majority of relationships were not significant, only the 
significant results are discussed. 
Despite the multivariate result revealing a result that was not significant, 
Pillai’s Trace = .083, F(15, 762) = 1.45, ρ = .12, the univariate F result F(5, 252) = 
3.03, ρ = .011, indicated  a significant relationship with perceptions of concerns 
about negative performance appraisal.  The post hoc least significant difference 
test indicated that participants who perceived this reason as the third most 
important negative reason had higher reporting ratios than the participants who did 
not rank this reason and the participants who perceived it as the most important 
negative reason. 
In regards to the relationships between reporting ratio and perceptions of 
not knowing what to report, the multivariate test did not yield a significant result, 
Pillai’s Trace = .094, F(15, 759) = 1.64, ρ = .059.  However, the univariate F result 
revealed a significant relationship, F(5, 253) = 3.04, ρ = .011.  Post hoc, least 
significant difference tests indicated that participants that ranked this as the fifth 
important practical reason had higher reporting ratios than other participants.   
 
Overall importance ratings.  Participants were asked to consider the three 
lists as three groups of reasons.  Participants then rated the overall importance of 
positive, negative and practical reasons on a six point rating scale, ranging from 
very unimportant to very important.  Table 2 indicates the means, standard 
deviations, medians, skewness and kutosis statistics for these variables.   
 
Table 2: Overall Importance ratings 
Variable  n M SD Mdn Skewness Kurtosis 
Positive Reasons  571 4.84 1.06 5 -1.02 1.08 
Negative Reasons 566 3.77 15.1 4 -.43 -.72 
Practical Reasons  569 4.36 1.29 5 -.90 .45 
n =sample size, M =mean, SD =standard deviation, Mdn =Median 
 
Wilcoxon Signed rank tests were conducted to evaluate the differences in 
ratings. Positive reasons were rated higher than both negative reasons, Z = 12.2, 
ρ < .001 and practical reasons Z = 7.21, ρ < .001.  Additionally, practical reasons 
were rated higher than negative reasons Z = 8.20, ρ < .001. 
 When evaluating the relationship with reporting ratio, the multivariate result, 
Pillai’s Trace = .046, F(12, 900) = 1.17, ρ = .30, and the univariate result, F(4, 300) 
= 1.52, ρ = .20, revealed no relationship with the overall importance ratings of 
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positive reasons.    Additionally, the multivariate result, Pillai’s Trace = .073, F(15, 
891) = 1.48, ρ = .11, and the univariate result, F(5, 297) = 1.45, ρ = .206, indicated 
no relationship with the overall importance ratings of negative reasons.  When 
considering the overall importance of practical reasons, the multivariate result was 
not significant, Pillai’s Trace = .081, F(15, 897) = 1.65, ρ = .055.  However, the 
univariate F result was significant F(5, 299) = 2.53, ρ = .029.  A post hoc least 
significant difference test indicated that reporting ratios were higher when practical 
reasons were perceived as very unimportant.   
 
Accountability.  Participants rated how strongly they disagreed or agreed 
with the statement “I believe an individual should be held accountable after a major 
incident” on a six point Likert scale.  The mean rating was 3.50 (SD =1.38).  The 
assumption of normality was upheld. 
When considering whether accountability perceptions were associated with 
reporting ratio, both the multivariate result, Pillai’s Trace = .045, F(15, 882) = .90, 
ρ = .57, and the univariate F result F(5, 294) = 1.76, ρ = .12, indicated no 
relationship existed.  It was expected that perceptions of accountability could 
enhance perceptions of the specific negative reasons, in particular fear of blame, 
so relationships were explored.    First relationships with the overall importance 
ratings were evaluated.  A Pearson’s correlation test indicated a significant positive 
relationship between accountability perceptions and the overall importance ratings 
of positive reasons r(510) = .10, ρ = .024, suggesting as perceptions of a need for 
accountability and individual responsibility increased, perceptions of the 
importance of overall positive reasons increased.  Pearson’s correlation tests 
indicated no relationships between accountability perceptions and the overall 
importance ratings of negative, r(506) = 0.069, ρ = .12, or practical reasons, r(509) 
= .003, ρ = .94.   
Spearman’s correlation tests were conducted to evaluate relationships with 
the specific negative reasons.  As overall positive reasons demonstrated a 
relationship with accountability, relationships with the specific positive reasons 
were also explored.    The majority of relationships were not significant.  Of the 
eleven negative reasons, one demonstrated a positive relationship and one a 
negative relationship with accountability perceptions.  As perceptions of 
accountability increased, rankings of being worried about tarnishing company 
records increased r(434) = .10, ρ = .034, and rankings of concerned I could teased 
or crticised by my supervisor decreased r(432) = -.11, ρ = .034.  Of the eight 
positive reasons, two positive relationships were found.  As perceptions of 
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accountability increased, rankings of reporting will result in the problem being fixed 
r(470) = .090, ρ = .044, and knowing management will read my report increased 
r(467) = 0.95, ρ = .040. 
 
Lack of knowledge.  As previous research suggested that the level of 
knowledge and understanding of the reporting process could influence decisions 
to report, the level of participants’ knowledge was explored.  419 participants 
(60.8% of all participants) provided a list of the steps required to report an incident 
for their current organisation.  This was measured by breaking reporting processes 
down into seven steps, initial management of incident, finding an incident form, 
completing an incident form, handing in an incident form, investigating the incident, 
corrective actions taken, and providing feedback to employees.  Out of the seven 
possible steps a participant could provide, the mean number of steps included was 
3.72 (SD = 1.29).   Furthermore, participants rated how confident they were in their 
understanding of the reporting process on a 6 point Likert scale.  The mean rating 
was 4.53 (SD = 1.15).   A Spearman’s correlation test indicated that as knowledge 
of the reporting process increased, ratings of perceived confidence in 
understanding of the reporting process increased r(418) = .13, ρ = .008. 
When considering whether a relationship between participant 
understanding and reporting ratio existed, both the multivariate result, Pillai’s Trace 
= .089, F(18, 732) = 1.25, ρ = .22, and the univariate F result F(6, 297) = .726, ρ = 
.63, were not significant.  However, in regards to perceived confidence in 
understanding of the reporting process, both the multivariate result, Pillai’s Trace 
= .097, F(15, 891) = 1.99, ρ = .013, and the univariate F result F(5, 297) = 2.44, ρ 
= .035, indicated a significant relationship.  Post hoc least significant difference 
tests indicated that participants who strongly agreed with the statement “I am 
confident in my understanding of the reporting process”, had higher reporting ratios 
than participants who somewhat agreed, somewhat disagreed, disagreed and 
strongly disagreed.  The difference in reporting ratios increased as perceived 
confidence decreased.   
 
Training.  Training on what and how to report an incident was expected to 
impact the level of knowledge employees had, and as result increase incident 
reporting.  71.4% of participants had received training on what and how to report 
an incident.   
When considering whether a relationship with reporting ratio existed, both 
the multivariate, Pillai’s Trace = .037, F(3, 299) = 3.80, ρ = .011, and the univariate 
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F result F(1, 301) = 6.70, ρ = .009, indicated a significant relationship. Participants 
who had received training had higher reporting ratios (M = 0.88, SD = 1.07), than 
participants who had not received training (M = 0.55, SD = 0.54). 
A Chi-Square test indicated no relationship between training and the level 
of participant knowledge and understanding of the reporting process χ2(6, 417) = 
4.44, ρ = .62.  However, a significant relationship was demonstrated with perceived 
confidence in their understanding of the reporting process χ2(5, 518) = 95.9, ρ < 
.001.  Participants that had received training were more confident in their 
understanding (M = 4.18, SD = 1.15), than participants that had not received 
training (M = 3.41, SD = 1.24). 
 
Time.  In previous research, lack of time was found to deter incident 
reporting. The present research explored participants’ perceptions of the time 
required.  Participants estimated that it takes a mean time of 13.0 minutes (SD = 
14.3) to complete an incident form for their current organisation.  This variable 
demonstrated skewness and kurtosis, violating normality, and requiring non-
parametric tests to explore relationships. 
530 participants (76.9%) perceived their estimated time to complete an 
incident form as reasonable.  Additionally, 156 participants (22.7%) provided an 
alternative time they perceived to be reasonable. The mean time was 9.82 minutes 
(SD =14.1).  A Mann-Whitney test indicated that participants who perceived their 
estimated time to be reasonable estimated shorter times to complete their incident 
forms (Mdn = 10.0) than participants who perceived their estimated time to be 
unreasonable (Mdn = 17.5), U =12769, ρ < .001.   
A Spearman correlation test indicated no significant relationship between 
reporting ratios and the times estimated to complete incident forms, r(410) = -.091, 
ρ = 0.066.  However, a Mann-Whitney test indicated that participants who 
perceived their estimated time as reasonable had higher reporting ratios (Mdn = 
1.00), than participants who perceived their estimated time as unreasonable (Mdn 
=0.50), U = 13128, ρ = .004. 
 
Incident form usability.  Previous research suggested that incident forms 
were too complex and difficult to use.  Therefore, perceptions of the incident form 
were explored.  Participants rated how easy it was to complete their current 
organisations’ incident form on a six point rating scale, ranging from very difficult 
to very easy.  The mean rating was 3.94 (SD = 1.27).   
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When considering the relationship between reporting ratio and incident 
form usability, both the multivariate, Pillai’s Trace = .10, F(15, 822) = 1.98, ρ = .015, 
and the univariate F result F(5, 274) = 3.03, ρ = .011, indicated a significant 
relationship.  Post hoc least significant difference tests indicated participants that 
perceived their incident form as very easy to use had higher reporting ratios.  
A Spearman’s correlation test indicated as perceptions of usability 
increased, the estimated time to complete an incident form decreased, r(507) = -
.32, ρ < .001.  A Chi-Square test revealed that participants who perceived their 
estimated time as reasonable rated their incident forms easier to use (M = 4.30, 
SD = 1.07), when compared to participants who perceived their estimated time as 
unreasonable (M = 2.89, SD = 1.04), χ2(5, 529) = 149, ρ < .001.   
 
Incident form design features.  Organisations were asked to provide a 
copy of their incident form so that elements of incident form design could be 
evaluated and relationships explored.  As organisations were located around New 
Zealand, this caused practical barriers in obtaining access to incident forms.  As a 
result this information was only collected for some organisations.   
Incident form medium (paper, electronic), was known for 8 of the 12 
organisations.  Five organisations (368 participants) used a paper based incident 
form and 3 organisations (230 participants) used an online reporting system.  When 
considering the relationship with reporting ratio, both the multivariate result, Pillai’s 
Trace = .030, F(3, 265) = 2.72, ρ = .045, and the univariate F result F(1, 267) = 
7.24, ρ = .008, indicated a significant relationship.  Participants using paper based 
incident forms had higher reporting ratios (M =.80, SD =.67) than participants using 
electronic incident forms (M = .58, SD =.57).   
In regards to the relationship with time, a Mann-Whitney test revealed that 
participants estimated electronic based incident forms took longer to complete 
(Mdn = 10.0, M = 15.1, SD = 19.6), when compared to paper based incident forms 
(Mdn = 10.0, M = 12.6, SD = 11.5), U = 31664, ρ = .043.  Additionally, a Chi-Square 
test indicated the percentage of participants that perceived their estimated time as 
reasonable was higher for paper based incident forms (85.6%), than electronic 
based incident forms (62.2%), χ2(1, 583) = 42.2, ρ < .001.  When considering 
incident form usability, a Chi-Square test indicated that paper based incident forms 
were easier to use (M = 4.15, SD = 1.11) than electronic incident forms (M = 3.41, 
SD = 1.26), χ2(5, 300) = 14.0, ρ = .015.  To summarise, participants using paper 
incident forms had higher reporting ratios, estimated shorter times to complete their 
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incident form, were more likely to perceive their estimated time as reasonable, and 
rated their incident form easier to use. 
Six organisations supplied their incident forms.  Five of these incident forms 
were paper based, and the other a print out of the electronic system. This bias was 
caused by difficulties in accessing interactive electronic systems.  Nevertheless, 
incident form design features were analysed for the sample collected (6 incident 
informs, representing 372 participants).  These incident forms varied in how they 
required a description of the incident, from one word questions such as 
“description”, to a series of what, where, how questions, to selecting the type of 
incident that occurred.  Incident forms demonstrated little distinctive differences in 
length, with most being one page, and incident forms had a similar number of 
questions.  Four incident forms (used by 294 participants) included multiple choice 
questions with at least 1 question with over 10 possible selections.  The other 2 
forms (used by 78 participants) used only open ended questions.   
When exploring the relationships with question style (multiple choice 
questions, open ended questions), both the multivariate result, Pillai’s Trace = .013, 
F(3, 178) = .77, ρ = .51, and the univariate F result F(1, 180) = .18, ρ = .68, indicated 
no relationship with reporting ratio.  However, a Mann-Whitney test indicated that 
participants using incidents forms with only open ended questions estimated 
shorter times to complete their organisations incident form (Mdn = 5.00), when 
compared to participants using forms that included multiple choice questions (Mdn 
= 10.0), U = 8057, ρ = .002.  Additionally, a Chi-Square test indicated that the 
percentage of participants that perceived their estimated time as reasonable was 
higher for open ended questions (93.4%), than multiple choice questions (83.7%), 
χ2(1, 365) = 4.62, ρ < .032.  A Chi-Square test indicated the same trend for incident 
form usability χ2(5, 300) = 14.0, ρ = .015.  Participants using forms with open ended 
questions rated their incident form as easier to use (M =4.59, SD = 0.97), when 
compared to participants using multiple choice questions (M =4.03, SD = 1.11).  In 
conclusion, incidents forms with open ended questions were associated with 
shorter times to complete the incident forms, participants were more likely to 
perceive their estimated time as reasonable, and rated their incident form easier to 
use.  However, when compared to multiple choice questions participants using 
open ended questions demonstrated no difference reporting ratios. 
Three incident forms (used by 312 participants) included information on the 
follow up stages of the reporting process.  For 2 organisations this was on the back 
page of the incident form, and the other attached to the front.  When exploring 
relationships, both the multivariate result, Pillai’s Trace = .003, F(3, 178) = .17, ρ = 
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.92, and the univariate F result F(1, 180) = .075, ρ = .78, indicated no relationship 
with reporting ratio.  In regards to time, a Mann-Whitney test indicated that the 
estimated time to complete an incident form was shorter for forms that did not 
include this information (Mdn = 5.00), than forms that included this information 
(Mdn = 10.0), U =5446, ρ < .001.  A Chi-Square test revealed that the percentage 
of participants that perceived their estimated time as reasonable was higher when 
incident forms did not include this information (98.3%), than when incident forms 
included this information (83.3%), χ2(1, 365) = 9.30, ρ = .002.  Additionally, a Chi-
Square test indicated that incident forms that did not include this information were 
rated easier to use (M = 4.05, SD = 1.120), than incident forms that included this 
information (M = 4.64, SD = .89), χ2(1, 300) = 12.2, ρ = .033. 
As providing information on the incident form was expected to be 
associated with increased knowledge of the reporting process, this relationship 
was explored.  However, Chi-Square tests indicated no relationships with 
participant knowledge and understanding χ2(6, 234) = 12.1, ρ = .059, or perceived 
confidence in knowledge and understanding χ2(5, 288) = 10.9, ρ = .054.  To 
summarise, providing this information on the incident did not appear to be helpful.  
It was not associated with increased knowledge or incident reporting, and when 
this information was included participants estimated longer times to complete the 
incident form, were less likely to perceive their estimated time as reasonable, and 
rated their incident forms harder to use. 
 
Differences between high and low risk organisations.  As mentioned 
earlier, organisations were categorised into high risk and low risk organisations 
depending on whether their incident rate was above or below the mean incident 
rate.  Low risk organisations (incident rates below the mean) demonstrated higher 
reporting ratios.  Therefore, relationships between low and high risk organisations 
and the factors that influence incident reporting were explored to evaluate whether 
these factors could account for the difference in incident and reporting rates. 
As previously discussed, perceived confidence in knowledge of the 
reporting process, training on what and how to report an incident, whether the time 
estimated to complete an incident form was perceived as reasonable, incident form 
usability and incident form medium demonstrated relationships with incident 
reporting ratios.  Consequently, these variables were used as a starting point for 
evaluating differences between low and high risk organisations.   
A Chi-Square test indicated that the percentage of employees trained in 
what and how to report an incident was higher for low risk organisations (84.0%), 
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when compared to high risk organisations (66.7%), χ2(1, 681) = 21.5, ρ < .001.  As 
training was associated with increased confidence in understanding of the 
reporting process, it is not surprising that a Chi-Square test indicated that 
participants from low risk organisations were more confident in their understanding 
(M = 4.73, SD = .93), than participants from high risk organisations (M = 4.42, SD 
= 1.24), χ2(5, 581) = 23.3, ρ < .001.  However, in regards to participant knowledge 
of understanding the reporting process, a Chi-Square test indicated that 
participants from high risk organisations had higher levels of knowledge of the 
reporting process (M = 3.87, SD = 1.22), than participants from low risk 
organisations (M = 3.50, SD = 1.38), χ2(6, 417) = 15.6, ρ = .016. 
When considering the time required to complete an incident form, a Mann-
Whitney test indicated no difference between the times estimated to complete an 
incident form for low and high risk organisations, U = 40170, ρ = .053.  However, a 
Chi-Square test indicated that the percentage of participants that perceived their 
estimated time as reasonable was higher for low risk organisations (90.8%), when 
compared to high risk organisations (74.1%), χ2(1, 665) = 24.1, ρ < .001. 
A Chi-Square test revealed the incident forms used by low risk 
organisations were rated easier to use (M = 4.61, SD = 0.90), than incident forms 
used by high risk organisations (M = 3.73, SD = 1.24), χ2(5, 533) = 59.7, ρ < .001.  
When considering specific incident form design elements, a Chi-Square test 
indicated a relationship with form medium (paper, electronic), χ2(1, 598) = 119, ρ < 
.001.  All 3 low risk organisations used paper based incident forms.  In contrast, of 
the 5 high risk organisations, 2 used paper incident forms and 3 used electronic 
systems.   
Additionally, 6 incident forms were analysed for design features, 3 belonged 
to low risk organisations and 3 were from high risk organisations.  A Chi-Square 
test indicated a significant difference in the question styles (multiple choice 
questions, open ended questions), χ2(1, 372) = 156, ρ < .001.  One low risk 
organisation included multiple choice questions, compared to all 3 high risk 
organisations. Furthermore, a Chi-Square test indicated a difference in whether 
information on the follow up stages of the reporting process was included on the 
incident form χ2(1, 372) = 39.7, ρ < .001.  Two low risk organisations included this 
information on their incident form compared to 1 high risk organisation. 
In regards to perceptions of accountability, a Chi-Square test indicated that 
participants from low risk organisations were more likely to agree with the 
statement “I believe an individual should be held accountable after a major 
incident” (M = 3.79, SD = 1.32), when compared to participants from high risk 
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organisations (M = 3.32, SD = 1.40), χ2(5, 511) = 16.7, ρ = .005.  Additionally, all 
positive, negative and practical factors explored in this study, were all perceived as 
important by a portion of participants.  Therefore, whether participants from low 
and high risk organisations differed in their perceptions was explored.  The results 
of thiis exploration is attached as Appendix 3.  A Chi-Square test indicated that 
participants from low risk organisations perceived positive reasons to be more 
important (M = 4.88, SD = 1.20), than participants from high risk organisations (M 
= 4.82, SD = .98, χ2(5, 568) = 18.8, ρ = .002.  Although other significant differences 
were found, these did not appear conceptually significant. 
 
Differences between full time and part time employees.  As previously 
mentioned, full time employees had higher reporting ratios (Mdn = 1.00), than part 
time employees (Mdn = .50).  Relationships with the factors found to influence 
incident reporting were explored to gain further understanding of this difference. 
When considering training on what and how to report an incident, a Chi-
Square test indicated that the percentage of full time employees trained was higher 
(82.9%), than the percentage of part time employees (70.5%).  In regards to the 
level of knowledge of the reporting process, Chi-Square tests indicated no 
relationship between employment type (full time, part time), and the level of 
knowledge and understanding of the reporting process, χ2(6, 407) = 6.34, ρ = .39, 
or perceived confidence in knowledge of the reporting process, χ2(5, 503) = 7.12, 
ρ = .21. 
When evaluating perceptions of the perceived time to complete an incident 
form, a Mann-Whitney test indicated no difference between the times estimated by 
full time and part time employees, U = 11035, ρ = .24.  Nevertheless, a Chi-Square 
test indicated that the percentage of full time employees that perceived their 
estimated time as reasonable was higher (82.9%), than the percentage of part time 
employees that perceived their estimated time as reasonable (70.5%), χ2(1, 493) 
= 5.40, ρ = .020.  Additionally, a Chi-Square test indicated that full time employees 
demonstrated higher ratings of incident form usability (M = 4.14, SD = 1.22), than 
part time employees (M = 3.65, SD = 1.52), χ2(5, 389) = 13.1, ρ = .022 
In regards to perceptions of importance, all relationships were explored 
through Chi-Square tests, but only significant relationships are discussed.  Part 
time employees perceived written feedback as more important (M = 1.36, SD = 
1.34), than full time employees (M = .77, SD = 1.21), χ2(5, 464) = 21.6, ρ = .001.  
When considering negative reasons, full time employees perceived disciplinary 
actions or punishments as more important (M = 1.79, SD = 1.81), than part time 
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employees (M = 1.05, SD = 1.51), χ2(5, 429) = 11.8, ρ = .038.  In contrast, part time 
employees rated not knowing how the incident report will be used as more 
important (M = 2.02, SD = 2.01), than full time employees (M = 1.32, SD = 1.87), 
χ2(5, 429) = 11.8, ρ = .038.  Additionally, part time staff perceived not knowing who 
is responsible for the incident as more important (M = 2.02, SD = 2.00), than full 
time employees (M = 1.06, SD = 1.63), χ2(5, 431) = 20.0, ρ = .001.  
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CHAPTER 4: 
Discussion 
The objective of the present research was to explore the number of incidents that 
occur in New Zealand organisations, the proportion of these incidents that were 
reported, and the factors influence their reporting.   
 
Findings 
The present research found an annual incident rate of 3.61 (8.59 SD) 
incidents per employee.  This measure was different to other measures of incident 
rate.  Rather than evaluating statistics of previous incidents, participants were 
asked how many incidents, accidents, close calls or near misses they had 
experienced over the past twelve months.  In addition to the differences in 
measurement, statistics are expected to reflect serious incidents, rather than near 
misses.  Therefore, this estimate may refer to a broader definition of incident rate.  
Consequently, comparisons with other measures of incident rates are limited.   
Nevertheless, based on the Safety Management Group’s (2015) calculation 
of the (total number of injuries and illnesses from previous year x 200,000) / number 
of hours worked by all employees, the estimated incident rate for the United States 
private sector in 2007, was 4.2 cases per 100 employees (Bureau of Labour 
Statistics, 2008).  The incident rate found in the present research is significantly 
higher than this estimate.  The Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and 
Safety (2013) suggested that the New Zealand fatality rate is higher than other 
countries.  The present findings indicated possible support for this claim, however 
due to the differences in measurement, this cannot be accurately determined. 
The second research question addressed what proportion of the incidents 
experienced were reported. For participants who reported experiencing an 
incident, the mean reporting ratio was 0.86 (1.71 SD), indicating approximately 
86.1% of incidents were reported, leaving an underreporting rate of 13.9%.  Other 
researchers have found underreporting rates of 59-79% (Psarros, et al., 2010), 
78% (Probst et al., 2008), 90% (Barrach 2000; Jones 2004), and 94% (Hazell & 
Shakir, 2006).  The underreporting rate found in the present research is 
significantly lower than rates found in previous research.   
The present research explored the factors that influence incident reporting.  
Perceptions of a number of positive, negative and practical reasons that could 
influence employee’s decisions to report were explored, and relationships with 
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reporting ratio evaluated.  Key findings are discussed first which has resulted in the 
hypotheses being discussed out of order. 
Previous research found participants stated lack of knowledge and 
understanding of the reporting process deterred employees from reporting 
incidents (Beasley et al., 2004; Evans et al., 2006; Jeffe et al., 2004; Kingston et 
al., 2004; Merchant & Gully, 2005; Prang & Jelsness-Jorgensen, 2004; Probst & 
Estrada, 2010; Schectman & Plews-Ogan, 2006; Taylor et al., 2004; Uribe et al., 
2002; Vincent et al., 1999; Wakefield et al., 1996; Wakefield et al., 1999; Walsh et 
al., 2010; Waring, 2005; Wild & Bradley 2005).  However, hypothesis four, that 
knowledge and understanding of the reporting process will be associated with 
increased incident reporting, was not supported.   
Despite this, hypothesis five, that perceived confidence in understanding of 
the reporting process will be associated with increased incident reporting was 
supported.  This provided support for Hsu and colleagues (2005) research that 
suggested that decisions are influenced by how ignorant people feel.   In regards 
to incident reporting, it seems it is not the level of knowledge that matters but the 
level of confidence in one’s knowledge that influences incident reporting. 
It was hypothesised that training would have a positive relationship with 
participants’ knowledge and understanding of the reporting process, and this would 
result in a positive relationship with incident reporting.   However, training was 
associated with increased confidence in their understanding of the reporting 
process, but not their actual understanding.   Nevertheless, hypothesis seven, 
training will be associated with increased incident reporting was supported.  This 
indicated that training is associated with increased incident reporting.   
To expand the knowledge surrounding incident reporting, perceptions of 
the incident form were explored.  It was hypothesised that incident reporting ratios 
would be higher when incident forms were quicker to complete and easier to use.  
However, no relationship was found between the time estimated to complete an 
incident form and participant’s incident reporting ratios.  Consequently, hypothesis 
ten was not supported.  Despite this, participants who perceived their estimated 
time as reasonable had higher reporting ratios.  Therefore, in regards to time, 
whether the time to complete the incident form is perceived as reasonable is the 
important factor.  Additionally, as the median time provided by participants who 
perceived their estimate as reasonable was 10 minutes, and mean alternative 
reasonable time provided was 9.82 minutes, incident forms that take less than 10 
minutes to complete were more likely to be perceived as reasonable. 
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Reporting ratios were higher when incident forms were perceived to be 
easy to use, supporting hypothesis eleven.  Additionally, hypothesis twelve was 
supported, as the estimated time to complete an incident form decreased as 
perceptions of usability increased.   
Three features of incident form design were analysed.  These were form 
medium (paper versus electronic), question style (multiple choice versus open 
ended questions) and whether information on the follow up stages of the reporting 
process was included on the incident form.  Participants using paper based incident 
forms had higher reporting ratios, estimated less time to complete their incident 
form, were more likely to perceive the estimated time as reasonable, and perceived 
their incident form as easier to use than participants using electronic mediums.  
This supports the research of Ammenwerth and colleagues (2003) and Prang and 
Jelsness-Jorgensen (2004) who found incident form medium influences incident 
reporting. 
When indicating the steps required to report an incident for their 
organisation, participants using an electronic system indicated steps of the 
reporting process that may not be considered by incident form designers.  These 
steps included getting lost trying to find the electronic incident form, forgetting and 
resetting passwords, and inability to log on to computer systems, requiring the need 
to find someone to assist.  Furthermore, some participants included three of four 
steps, in reference to click here, then here, then here, before completing the 
incident form, indicating the incident reporting process does not start with the 
incident form for participants using electronic incident forms.   This suggests that 
employee perceptions of the time required and the usability of electronic systems 
should be considered. 
When considering the style of questions used on incident forms, no 
relationship was demonstrated with reporting ratio.  However, participants using 
forms with open ended questions estimated less time to complete their incident 
form, were more likely to perceive the estimated time as reasonable, and perceived 
their incident form as easier to use. 
The reporting ratios of participants using forms that included information on 
the follow up stages of reporting were no different from participants using forms 
that did not include this information.  However, when this information was excluded, 
participants estimated shorter times to complete their incident form, were more 
likely to perceive the estimated time as reasonable, and perceived their incident 
form as easier to use.  Additionally, the inclusion of this information showed no 
relationship with incident reporting or the level of understanding of the reporting 
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process.  Therefore, the inclusion of this information does not appear to be very 
beneficial. 
However, when each of the seven steps of the reporting process were 
considered, the inclusion of this information on the incident form was associated 
with an increased likelihood of including “handing in the incident form” as a step in 
the reporting process.  This suggests including this information assists in reminding 
participants of where they are meant to hand in their completed incident form.   
When asked whether there were any other practical reasons that influence 
participants’ decisions to report incidents, a range of comments were made about 
incident forms.  The availability of the incident form is important, with some 
participants stating they struggle to locate the incident form, and there is a need for 
clarity of process to follow to report an incident.  Additionally, one participant 
referred to attitudes surrounding completing the incident form, stating when the 
incident form is completed incorrectly, the focus turns from safety to completing the 
incident form and ticking the right boxes.  This process becomes frustrating for 
employees.  This suggests a need for the purpose of incident reporting to main the 
focus during incident reporting. 
Some participants discussed the appropriateness of incident forms for 
special circumstances.  For example, one participant mentioned the difficulty in 
reporting a fatality, as this is a key incident, a sensitive topic, and it can be difficult 
to explain adequately in writing.  Additionally, stress was mentioned, which is 
deemed a hazard but difficult to report, in particular reporting that a colleague 
appears stressed.  This suggests a possible need for an alternative reporting 
system for special circumstances that are difficult to record in writing. 
The present research explored the relative importance of eight positive 
reasons, eleven negative reasons and eight practical reasons that previous 
research indicated influenced incident reporting.  These represented the specific 
outcomes that could be weighted and factored into a decision to report an incident. 
All reasons were ranked in the top five reasons by a portion of participants, 
supporting previous research in the area research. The relative importance of 
these reasons is attached as Table 3.  
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Table 3: The relative importance of positive, negative and practical reasons. 
 
 Positive Reasons Negative Reasons Practical Reasons 
Most 
Important 
(Rank 1) 
 Reporting will result in the problem 
being fixed 
 Concerned I might be blamed for 
the incident 
 Lack of time due to high work 
demands or time pressures 
Very 
Important 
(Rank 2-5) 
 Improvements or changes will occur 
as a result of my incident report 
 The organisation will learn from my 
incident report 
 Knowing management will read my 
report and find it useful 
 Knowing my supervisor will support 
my decision 
 Receiving written feedback on my 
incident report 
 Concerned I could be seen as 
incompetent 
 Concerns of disciplinary actions or 
other punishments 
 Concerns about my reputation or 
professional credibility 
 Concerns about legal liability or 
actions 
 Not knowing how the incident report 
will be used 
 Lack of time due to difficult working 
conditions 
 Not knowing what to report 
 A difficult or impractical incident 
form 
 Not having an adequate reporting 
system 
 Not knowing where or how to report 
 Not liking paperwork 
Important 
(Rank <5) 
 Knowing my colleagues will support 
my decision 
 Receiving verbal feedback on my 
incident report 
 Not knowing who is responsible for 
the incident 
 Concerned about negative 
performance appraisal 
 Concerned I could be criticised or 
teased by my colleagues 
 Concerned I could be criticised or 
teased by my supervisor 
 Worried about tarnishing company 
records 
 Paperwork is not part of my job 
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The first four positive reasons refer to changes that occur after the incident 
has been reported, investigated and managed.  Additionally, when asked if there 
were any other positive reasons that influence their decision to report an incident, 
a number of comments confirmed the importance of the need for changes to occur 
after an incident.  Comments included references to keeping mates and patients 
safe, and reporting can speed up the process of change and influence safety.  This 
indicates the importance of making corrective changes after an incident report is 
lodged, improving safety and providing feedback to employees on the changes that 
have occurred.   
In support of the importance of feedback, one participant suggested that 
feedback should be mandatory.  Furthermore, the fact written feedback has been 
given a higher ranking than verbal feedback is interesting.  Adams (1963) equity 
theory suggests employees strive to maintain a balance between their inputs and 
their outputs.  This is to say employees consider what they are giving an 
organisation and what they gain in return.  If an employee takes time to write an 
incident report, they may expect written feedback in return and verbal feedback 
may not suffice.   
Unique to New Zealand, is the Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) 
which provides comprehensive, no-fault personal injury cover (2013, August 15).  
Participants stated reporting incidents assisted and supported their ACC claims, or 
could provide evidence of an injury should the need for a claim arise.  This 
motivated incident reporting. 
When considering negative reasons, the first four negative reasons 
indicated negative outcomes that affect the individual directly, and hinting at a 
culture of blame.  One participant mentioned the difference in approach from the 
CEO and the middle management, with the CEO promoting a learning culture, but 
management blaming employees for incidents.    This indicated blame cultures 
could be existent in New Zealand organisations.  Furthermore, one participant 
argued for a need for transparency of the outcomes that will occur after incident 
reporting.  This suggests while the focus on system issues is the best method in 
theory (Phimister, 2000; Reason, 1990), focuses on individual issues may occur in 
practice.   
All reasons presented to participants were perceived as important to 
employees when deciding whether or not to report an incident.  However, the 
majority of reasons did not demonstrate a direct relationship with participants’ 
incident reporting ratios.  Additionally, for the two reasons were a relationship was 
found, these relationships do not appear conceptually significant.  This supports 
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Prang and Jelsness-Jorgensen’s (2014) conclusion that underreporting most likely 
stems from a complex mix of these factors. 
When considering the overall importance of positive, negative and practical 
reasons, positive reasons were rated the most important, followed by practical 
reasons, and finally negative reasons.  Therefore hypothesis one, either or both 
negative and practical reasons will be perceived as more important than positive 
reasons was not supported.  Additionally, no relationship was found between 
reporting ratio and the overall importance of positive and negative reasons.  
However, participants reporting ratios were higher when practical reasons were 
perceived as very unimportant.   
Robotham, (2014) suggests society is constructed in a manner that 
promotes finding a person to be blamed and punished for negative occurrences 
such as accidents.  Therefore, participants were expected to agree with the 
statement “I believe an individual should be held accountable after a major 
accident”, and these perceptions were expected to be associated with negative 
reasons.  However, the mean rating of 3.50 suggests participants neither agree 
nor disagree with this statement.  Participants did not appear to like answering this 
question, with some circling both somewhat agree and somewhat disagree.  In 
addition, there were numerous comments that stated participant’s agreed, but only 
in situations where an individual is genuinely at fault. 
 No relationships were found with the overall importance ratings of negative 
reasons or the majority of specific negative reasons, including fear of being blamed. 
Therefore hypotheses two, perceptions of a need for individual accountability will 
have a positive relationship with negative reasons, and hypothesis three, 
perceptions of a need for individual accountability will have a positive relationship 
with fear of being blamed were not supported.   
Whether participants reporting ratios and perceptions of factors that 
influence incident reporting differed based on their demographic variables was 
explored.  Organisations were categorised into high and low risk organisations 
depending on whether their mean incident rate was above or below the overall 
mean of 3.61 incidents experienced annually.  Low risk organisations (incident 
rates below the mean), demonstrated higher reporting ratios.  This provides 
support for the conclusion incident reporting enhances safety (Phimister et al., 
2000; Reason, 1990; Storgard et al., 2012). 
Participants from low risk organisations were more likely to be trained, 
estimated shorter times to complete their organisations incident form, were more 
likely to perceive their estimated time as reasonable, and rated their incident form 
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as easier to use.  As these variables have demonstrated relationships with incident 
reporting, this could have enhanced incident reporting, allowing for management 
of hazards and reduction in incident rate 
In regards to perceptions of importance, a range of differences were found 
across low and high risk organisations.  A key difference was participants from low 
risk organisations perceived overall positive reasons as more important.  This 
suggests low risk organisations may place emphasis on positive reasons in the 
workplace, possibly ensuring positive outcomes occur as a result of incident 
reporting.   
Furthermore, low risk organisations were more likely to agree with the 
statement “I believe an individual should be held accountable after a major 
incident”.  This suggests accountability may have a positive relationship with 
safety. 
 When considering employment classification, full time employees had 
higher reporting ratios than part time employees.   Full time employees were more 
likely to be trained, were more likely to perceive their estimated time to complete 
their incident form as reasonable, and rated their incident form as easier to use.  
As these variables have demonstrated a relationship with incident reporting, these 
differences could account for the differences in incident reporting. 
Part time staff run a risk of not working and/or not being available to work 
when training is conducted, are more likely to miss meetings, and can often miss 
information shared to full time staff.  In regards to perceptions of importance, part 
time employees perceive written feedback as more important than full time 
employees.  Written feedback could be communication of information they may not 
receive otherwise.   
Anderson et al., (2013) found that the level of involvement in the reporting 
process may affect attitudes towards incident reporting.  In one hospital, clinical 
staff where involved in the investigation phase of incident reporting and reviewed 
incidents.  These staff demonstrated high levels of knowledge and ownership of 
the incident reporting system.  In contrast, in another hospital fewer clinical staff 
were involved in the investigation and follow up stages of reporting.  In this hospital 
there were higher rates of skepticism, and staff were less willing to report incidents.  
As supervisors and health and safety managers are expected to deeper 
involvement in incident reporting and investigations, it is surprising that in the 
present study no differences were found between the reporting ratios of 
employees, supervisors and health and safety managers or business owners. 
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Limitations 
This survey relied on self-report data.  Self-report data can be inaccurate 
due to lack of ability to recall information, in particular the recall of safety accidents 
(Probst & Estrada, 2010).  Additionally, self-report data can be affected by 
impression management (Probst & Estrada, 2010).  It is possible participants 
provided what they believed was the desired answer (Chiang et al., 2010).   
Furthermore, the measure of incident rate and incident reporting is limited.  
These measures were limited by participants’ interpretation and definition of the 
words incident, accident, near miss or close call, and their memory of incidents.  
Due to the availability bias (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), it is expected participants’ 
estimates will reflect the more significant or serious incidents than minor incidents.  
This conclusion is supported by research which suggests minor incidents were 
forgotten after extended recall periods (Landen & Hendriks, 1995; Probst & 
Estrada, 2010).   
Furthermore, awareness of all incidents occurring is required to achieve an 
accurate answer.  As lack of awareness of incidents acts as a barrier to reporting 
incidents (Wakefield et al., 1995; Wakefield et al., 1999), this is expected to have 
impacted results.  Therefore, it is possible this statistic reflects an underestimate of 
the average number of incidents an employee experiences annually. 
Additionally, the error rate surrounding incidents experienced and the error 
rate surrounding the number of incidents reported, may not be equal.  To report an 
incident, awareness that the incident has occurred is required, consequently lack 
of awareness is highly unlikely to affect participants’ estimates.  Additionally, under 
the availability bias participants were expected to remember the severe incidents 
over the minor incidents.  It is expected that the value of incident reporting will be 
perceived as higher for severe incidents.  Therefore, severe incidents were more 
likely to be remembered and reported.  Thus, the availability bias may not affect 
this statistic to the same extent.  This could explain the high reporting rate and low 
underreporting rate found in the present research.  However, as the direction of the 
bias is against the hypotheses, the incident rates, reporting rates and relationships 
found with incident reporting were still significant, and provide insightful information 
for businesses. 
As this is a New Zealand sample, the results may not be able to be 
generalised beyond a New Zealand context.  Additionally, organisation and 
participant recruitment limits results.  The majority of organisations that agreed to 
be involved in the study were recruited through safety networking groups, and the 
HR Manager or Advisor indicated interest by responding to a post or email.  This 
   
55 
suggests the organisations recruited have health and safety personnel who are 
active in the industry.  This could influence the type of safety policies in place, and 
the culture and established norms of the organisations involved, which could 
impact the results.  Furthermore, the types of organisations that may have been 
interested in this study could represent two ends of a spectrum when it comes to 
incident reporting; those who have difficulties getting employees to report incidents 
and want to know why, and those with well-established reporting cultures who were 
wanting feedback on their current systems.   
In regards to the selection of employees, organisations were told front line 
employees that are at risk of experiencing incidents are the ideal participants, this 
could have biased incident rates and perceptions of incident reporting.  
Additionally, the selection of employees to participate in the study was heavily 
influenced by the organisations involved, and the practicalities, time barriers, and 
job tasks and demands they work within.  For some organisations distribution and 
collection of surveys was controlled by the organisations.  This could have 
influenced the type of participants that were selected and involved in the study, and 
possibly influenced their answers.   
Some participants were recruited by positing links to the survey on an 
organisation online communication board.  This required participants to click the 
link and complete the survey.  This could have caused a response bias, and the 
participants who chose to answer this survey may have an interest in health and 
safety or incident reporting, or may have had negative experiences with incident 
reporting that they wanted to share.  
Some questionnaires were partially completed.  There may have been 
trends in the dropout rates for particular questions, with a particular selection of 
participants actively choosing not to answer.  This meant comparisons and analysis 
was conducted for different sample sizes based on the amount of responses 
available.  However, as a large sample size was collected this effect is expected to 
be reduced.  These factors could have influenced the reliability and accuracy of the 
data and whether the sample is representative of the population.  
This study explored participants’ perceptions.  Based on the theory of 
reasoned action (Igbaria et al., 1997), it is presumed these attitudes and 
perceptions will be associated with behavioural intent, and actual actions.  
However, it is possible incident reporting is an exception.  The majority of the 
factors employees ranked important to influencing their decision to report incidents, 
did not demonstrate relationships with incident reporting measures.  This could be 
a result of limitations in measures, or the combination of variables affecting incident 
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reporting.  However, it is also possible the assumption that perceptions will lead to 
behaviour is a false assumption.  Therefore, this could limit the extent to which 
these findings can be applied to practice.  
 
Implications 
Every incident an employee experiences has the ability to have drastic 
effects for both the individual employee and the employer (Ministry of Business and 
Innovation, 2014).  In larger organisations, an annual incident rate of 3.61 incidents 
per employee could equate to substantial number of incidents occurring.  
Therefore, reducing incident rates should remain a priority. 
Based on the differences in organisation incident and reporting rates, the 
present research has supported the conclusion that incident reporting was 
associated with lower incident rates (Phimister et al., 2000; Reason, 1990, 
Storgard et al., 2012).  This finding provides confirmation for practitioners that 
incident reporting does increase safety and organisations should promote and 
invest in incident reporting. 
The key focus of the present research was to be able to provide an 
indication for organisations on how to increase incident reporting in the workplace.  
Organisations demonstrated differences in perceptions on every variable explored 
in this study.  Each organisation has its own culture, shared values, beliefs, 
traditions and norms that exist within the organisation (Aamodt, 2010), which could 
account for these differences.  This indicates an organisation specific approach is 
required when addressing incident reporting and health and safety in the 
workplace.  Nevertheless, the present research has indicated some key factors 
that should be addressed to enhance incident reporting in the workplace. 
Based on the findings of the present research, employees should be trained on 
what and how to report an incident.  Training should aim to increase employee 
confidence in the understanding of the reporting process, which could be achieved 
by increasing employee knowledge of the reporting process.  This study did not 
explore the content covered in training, the retention of training, or whether 
participants perceived training as valuable.  This raises the question, is it the type 
of training that occurs or the fact training has occurred that influences incident 
reporting?  In regards to the content of training, future research could explore what 
elements of training increase incident reporting.  It is possible training could have 
covered the purpose of reporting, the positive outcomes that occur through incident 
reporting, or facilitated a reporting culture which could be influencing this 
relationship.     
   
57 
Additionally, organisations could review their incident form.  The present 
research found that incident forms should ideally take under 10 minutes to 
complete, be easy to use, and designed in a manner that promotes incident 
reporting.    Future research is required to explore the impact of various incident 
form design elements on incident reporting.  Nevertheless, three elements of 
incident form design were explored and their implications discussed.   
As incident reporting was higher when using paper based incident forms, 
incident form medium should be reviewed within the context of an organisation.  
Incident reporting systems are often upgraded to electronic systems to make things 
easier and more efficient.  However, often those designing incident forms, policy 
makers, and those investigating incidents frequently work with computers, set up 
and understand the processes.  The present findings suggests employees do not 
necessarily find these systems more efficient and easier to use.  When deciding 
whether electronic incident forms are appropriate for an organisation, organisations 
should consider employee access to computers and their confidence and 
experience using computers.  Where electronic systems are deemed the best 
solution, usability should be considered and reviewed from an employee 
perspective.  This review should include the time and usability of finding the 
incident form. Furthermore, organisations should consider whether a combined 
paper and electronic system would be viable.  
One participant mentioned as they were an independent contractor, they 
lacked access to an electronic incident form as a result of not having an employee 
login.  This highlights the importance of ensuring access to incident forms, but also 
raises a separate issue of the target audience of incident forms.  If organisations 
frequently have independent contractors’ onsite or other third parties, they may 
want to consider if and how this group of people should be reporting incidents.  
In regards to the question style of incident forms, organisations may want 
to consider if open ended questions rather than multiple choice questions would 
provide the information they require.  Multiple choice questions can be perceived 
as harder to use, and take to longer to complete.  In an additional comment one 
participant mentioned the difficulty reporting incidents that do not quite fit within the 
available options.  This becomes frustrating, and raises employee concerns that 
the incident will not be reviewed accordingly.  The present findings suggests if 
multiple choices questions are deemed the most appropriate, designers should 
ensure employees perceive incident forms are easy to use, and they fit the 
incidents that occur in the workplace. 
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The present research found no added value in including information on the 
follow up stages of incident reporting.  Therefore incident form designers may want 
to include where the incident form should be handed to, but may want to avoid 
complicating the incident form with excess information.  Additionally, this finding 
suggests incident reporting and incident investigations may need to be separate.  
Most of the incident forms that included information about the reporting process, 
included it as another form an investigator could complete.  There is added value 
in keeping this information together.  However, including this information may deter 
incident reporting.  Therefore organisations may want to consider other options for 
managing this information and keeping reporting and investigating information 
together. 
In addition, the three lists of positive, negative and practical reasons were 
all rated important by a portion of participants.  This indicates organisations can 
consider these reasons and how they fit within their business, to promote incident 
reporting.  If limited funds or resources are available, knowing the relative 
importance of these reasons could assist in identifying the areas that should be 
addressed first.  Additionally, when participants rated the overall importance of 
positive, negative and practical reasons, positive reasons were rated the most 
important followed by practical then negative reasons.  Again this order of 
importance could assist in identifying the areas that should be addressed first.  
Furthermore, the present research has highlighted the importance of engaging part 
time employees in the incident reporting process and providing written feedback 
on the incidents they do report. 
The need for accountability and individual responsibility appears to be a 
topical area, with some professionals promoting the need to focus on system 
issues (Phimister et al., 2000, Reason, 1990) and others promoting a need for 
individual responsibility (Regulatory Training Centre, 2015).  Theoretically, the 
promotion of individual accountability in a business could have positive and 
negative effects.  If employees were held accountable for accidents, and 
experience disciplinary actions as a result of causing an accident, this is likely to 
deter incident reporting.  In contrast, if employees feel responsible for health and 
safety, and managers were held accountable for actions of their employees, this 
could promote safety in the workplace.  Future research could explore the effect of 
accountability and individual responsibility on safety. 
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Conclusion 
The participants in the present research reported that on average they 
experienced 3.61 incidents over a 12 month period, and reported 86.1% of 
incidents they experienced.  As incident reporting was associated with lower 
incident rates, incident reporting enhances safety and should become or remain a 
priority for organisations.   
The present research has expanded the knowledge and understanding of 
employee perceptions towards incident reporting.  If an organisation would like to 
promote incident reporting in their workplace, an organisation specific approach is 
required.  However, key actions include ensuring that all employees are trained in 
what and how to reporting an incident, and ensuring that their incident form is quick 
and easy to use.  Additionally, incident form design and usability should be 
reviewed from an employee perspective.  Furthermore, an organisation should 
review how the positive, negative and practical reasons discussed in this research 
could be motivating or deterring incident reporting in their workplace. 
There are five key areas of interest that future research could address.  
These areas include the content of training and its impact on incident reporting, 
different elements of incident form design and their impact on incident reporting, 
how factors combine and interact to influence decisions to report incidents, whether 
the number of incidents experienced and reported differ across organisations, 
industries and countries, and the effect of accountability and individual 
responsibility on safety.
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Questionnaire 
Incident Reporting Questionnaire 
 
Thank you for participating in this study.  This study is interested in what you as an 
employee think about incident reporting.  The study hopes to be able to tell 
organisations which areas to focus on when reviewing their incident form and 
reporting processes.  Your answers will remain anonymous and confidential, and 
individual answers will not be reported back to your organisation.  Should you wish 
to withdraw from the study, you can do so at any time, without penalty.  The 
questionnaire consists of 26 questions, and should take you approximately 10 
minutes. 
Please answer as honestly as possible. 
 
1. Have you received training on what and how to report an incident in your 
workplace? 
☐Yes 
☐No 
 
2. In the past 12 months, approximately how many safety accidents, close calls or 
near misses have you experienced? 
 
 
3. In the past 12 months, approximately how many safety accidents, close calls or 
near misses have you reported? 
 
 
4. If you have reported an incident, close call or near miss for the organisation you 
currently work for, please rate how easy you found the process. 
 
Very 
Difficult 
 
Difficult 
Somewhat 
Difficult 
Somewhat 
Easy 
 
Easy 
 
Very Easy 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
5. If your organisation uses an incident form, how much time would you expect to 
take to complete your organisation's current incident form? 
__________minutes  
 
6. Do you think this time is reasonable? 
☐Yes 
☐No 
 
7. If your organisation does not use an incident form or you answered "No" to 
Question 6, what do you think is a reasonable amount of time to complete an 
incident form? 
__________minutes 
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Questions 8-16 consider three groups of reasons that affects or could affect your 
decision of whether to report an incident.  These three groups are: 
 
 Positive reasons:   
Positive outcomes that motivate you to report an incident.   
For example, something will be changed so the incident will not 
occur again. 
 
 Negative reasons: 
Negative outcomes that prevent you from reporting an incident.   
For example, concerned about being blamed for the incident. 
 
 Practical reasons:      
Conditions that make reporting impractical and prevent you 
reporting an incident.   
For example, limited time to complete the incident report. 
 
 
8. A list of positive reasons is presented below.   
 
First, please tick the five factors you believe are the most important.  
 
Secondly, please number these five ticked factors (1-5) in order of importance (1 
being the most important). 
 
 Most 
Important 
Factors 
In Order of 
Importance 
 Please tick 
the five 
factors you 
believe are 
the most 
important 
Please number 
the five factors 
in order of 
importance (1= 
most 
important) 
Reporting will result in the problem being fixed ☐  
The organisation will learn from my incident 
form 
☐  
Improvements or changes will occur as a result 
of my incident form 
☐  
Knowing my supervisor will support my decision ☐  
Knowing my colleagues will support my decision  ☐  
Knowing management will read my report and 
find it useful 
☐  
Receiving written feedback on my incident form ☐  
Receiving verbal feedback on my incident form ☐  
 
9. In addition to the list above, are there any other positive reasons you would 
consider when deciding whether to report an incident? 
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10. A list of negative reasons is presented below.   
 
First, please tick the five factors you believe are the most important.  
 
Secondly, please number these five ticked factors (1-5) in order of importance (1 
being the most important). 
 
 Most 
Important 
Factors 
In Order of 
Importance 
 Please select 
the five 
factors you 
believe are 
the most 
important 
Please number 
the five factors 
in order of 
importance (1= 
most 
important) 
Concerned I might be blamed for the incident ☐  
Concerned about negative performance 
appraisal 
☐  
Concerns of disciplinary actions or other 
punishments 
☐  
Worried about tarnishing company records ☐  
Concerned I could be seen as incompetent ☐  
Concerns about my reputation or professional 
credibility 
☐  
Concerns about legal liability or actions ☐  
Not knowing how the incident form will be used ☐  
Not knowing who is responsible for the incident ☐  
Concerned I could be criticised or teased by my 
supervisor 
☐  
Concerned I could be criticised or teased by my 
colleagues 
☐  
 
11. In addition to the list above, are there any other negative reasons you would 
consider when deciding whether to report an incident? 
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12. A list of practical reasons is presented below.   
 
First, please tick the five factors you believe are the most important.  
 
Secondly, please number these five ticked factors (1-5) in order of importance (1 
being the most important). 
 
 Most 
Important 
Factors 
In Order of 
Importance 
 Please select 
the five 
factors you 
believe are 
the most 
important 
Please number 
the five factors 
in order of 
importance (1= 
most 
important) 
Lack of time due to high work demands or time 
pressures 
☐  
Lack of time due to difficult working conditions ☐  
Not liking paperwork ☐  
Paperwork is not part of my job ☐  
Not having an adequate reporting system ☐  
Not knowing what to report ☐  
Not knowing where or how to report ☐  
A difficult or impractical incident form ☐  
 
13. In addition to the list above, are there any other practical reasons you would 
consider when deciding whether to report an incident?? 
 
 
14. Overall how important do you think positive reasons are when deciding whether 
to report an incident. 
Not at all 
Important 
Very 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Important 
 
Important 
Very 
Important 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
 
15. Overall how important do you think negative reasons are when deciding 
whether to report an incident. 
Not at all 
Important 
Very 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Important 
 
Important 
Very 
Important 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
 
16. Overall how important do you think practical reasons are when deciding 
whether to report an incident. 
Not at all 
Important 
Very 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Important 
 
Important 
Very 
Important 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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17. From your understanding, please write in your own words the process of 
reporting an incident. List as many steps as required for your organisation. 
 
(e.g. Collect incident form from office, complete incident form, give incident form to 
Supervisor, Supervisor will read and lodge with management, hear about the follow 
up of the incident from Supervisor). 
 
a) __________________________________________________________ 
b) __________________________________________________________ 
c) __________________________________________________________ 
d) __________________________________________________________ 
e) __________________________________________________________ 
f) __________________________________________________________ 
g) __________________________________________________________ 
h) __________________________________________________________ 
i) __________________________________________________________ 
j) __________________________________________________________ 
 
For questions 18 and 19, please indicate whether you agree/disagree with the 
following statements: 
 
18.  I am confident in my understanding of the incident reporting processes 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
19. I believe an individual should be held accountable after a major accident 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
20. Do you have any other comments you would like to make in regards your 
company's incident form, or your thoughts on the reporting process? 
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21. Please indicate your employment type 
☐Full Time 
☐Part Time 
 
 
22. Which best describes your current level of employment? 
☐Supervisor 
☐Employee 
☐Health and Safety Advisor or Manager 
☐Business Owner 
 
 
23. How long have you been with your current organisation? 
_______ Years  ______Months 
 
 
24. Please indicate your gender 
☐Male 
☐Female 
 
 
25. Please indicate your age 
_________ Years 
 
 
26. What Company/Organisation do you work for? 
 
 
 
Answers from this questionnaire will be analysed and key findings will be provided 
to your organisation.  If you would like to receive a copy of this report please add 
your email address. 
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Appendix 2: Mean ranks of positive, negative and practical reasons 
 
Mean Ranks 
Variable n M SD 
Positive reasons    
Reporting will result in the problem being fixed 522 3.85 1.59 
The organisation will learn from my incident report 520 2.92 1.53 
Improvements or changes will occur as a result of my incident report 521 3.63 1.37 
Knowing my supervisor will support my decision 517 1.02 1.39 
Knowing my colleagues will support my decision 519 0.73 1.25 
Knowing management will read my report and find it useful 519 1.44 1.33 
Receiving written feedback on my incident report 520 0.86 1.24 
Receiving verbal feedback on my incident report 517 0.62 1.07 
    
Negative reasons    
Concerned I might be blamed for the incident 478 2.24 2.06 
Concerned about negative performance appraisal 477 1.19 1.72 
Concerns of disciplinary actions or other punishments 477 1.63 1.77 
Worried about tarnishing company records 478 0.58 1.33 
Concerned I could be seen as incompetent 476 1.69 1.76 
Concerns about my reputation or professional credibility 477 1.62 1.79 
Concerns about legal liability or actions 477 1.59 1.96 
Not knowing how the incident report will be used 477 1.47 1.92 
Not knowing who is responsible for the incident 479 1.21 1.72 
Concerned I could be criticised or teased by my supervisor 476 0.53 1.28 
Concerned I could be criticised or teased by my colleagues 475 0.58 1.24 
    
Practical reasons    
Lack of time due to high work demands or time pressures 482 3.87 1.67 
Lack of time due to difficult working conditions 482 2.34 1.84 
Not liking paperwork 482 1.06 1.57 
Paperwork is not part of my job 482 0.32 0.93 
Not having an adequate reporting system 482 1.20 1.67 
Not knowing what to report 481 1.58 1.72 
Not knowing where or how to report 483 1.18 1.57 
A difficult or impractical incident form 482 1.84 1.87 
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Appendix 3: Wilcoxon signed rank tests – Z scores for positive, negative and practical reasons 
 Positive Reasons 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
1. Reporting will result in the problem being fixed  2.72*** 4.81*** 17.6*** 18.9*** 16.7*** 18.9*** 19.1*** 
2. The organisation will learn from my incident report 2.72***  7.03*** 14.1*** 15.7*** 13.8*** 15.2*** 17.4*** 
3. Improvements or changes will occur as a result of my incident report 4.81*** 7.03***  18.0*** 18.3*** 14.6*** 19.0*** 19.7*** 
4. Knowing my supervisor will support my decision 17.6*** 14.1*** 18.0***  4.39*** 5.93*** 1.04 3.62*** 
5. Knowing my colleagues will support my decision 18.9*** 15.7*** 18.3*** 4.39***  9.17*** 2.86** .75 
6. Knowing management will read my report and find it useful 16.7*** 13.8*** 14.6*** 5.93*** 9.17***  7.50*** 10.4*** 
7. Receiving written feedback on my incident report 18.9*** 15.2*** 19.0*** 1.04 2.86** 7.50***  2.73** 
8. Receiving verbal feedback on my incident report 19.1*** 17.4*** 19.7*** 3.62*** .75 10.4*** 2.73**  
* = ρ < .05, ** = ρ < .01, *** = ρ < .001 
 
 
        
 Negative Reasons 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 
1. Concerned I might be blamed for the incident  7.98*** 5.15*** 11.8*** 4.57*** 4.52*** 4.54*** 4.99*** 7.38*** 12.3*** 12.0*** 
2. Concerned about negative performance 
appraisal 
7.98***  4.06*** 5.78*** 4.26*** 3.75*** 2.97** 2.34* .012 6.62*** 5.88*** 
3. Concerns of disciplinary actions or other 
punishments 
5.15*** 4.06***  9.08** .53 .11 .21 .98 3.03*** 8.98*** 9.01*** 
4. Worried about tarnishing company records 11.8*** 5.78*** 9.08**  9.29*** 8.87*** 8.77*** 7.35*** 5.95*** .51 .13 
5. Concerned I could be seen as incompetent 4.57*** 4.26*** .53 9.29***  .50 .84 1.21 3.88*** 9.63*** 9.67*** 
6. Concerns about my reputation or professional 
credibility 
4.52*** 3.75*** .11 8.87*** .50  .21 1.15 3.36*** 9.49*** 9.32*** 
7. Concerns about legal liability or actions 4.54*** 2.97*** .21 8.77*** .84 .21  .81 3.15*** 8.19*** 8.40*** 
8. Not knowing how the incident report will be 
used 
1.99*** 2.34* .98 7.35*** 1.21 1.15 .81  2.77** 8.18*** 8.20*** 
9. Not knowing who is responsible for the 
incident 
7.3*** .012 3.03** 5.95*** 3.88*** 3.36*** 3.15*** 2.77**  6.19*** 6.40*** 
10. Concerned I could be criticised or teased by 
my supervisor 
12.3*** 6.62*** 8.98** .51 9.63*** 9.49*** 8.19*** 8.18*** 6.19***  .69 
11. Concerned I could be criticised or teased by 
my colleagues 
12.0*** 5.88*** 9.01*** .13 9.67*** 9.32*** 8.40*** 8.20*** 6.40*** .69  
* = ρ < .05, ** = ρ < .01, *** = ρ < .001 
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 Practical Reasons 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
1. Lack of time due to high work demands or time pressures  15.0*** 16.2*** 18.2*** 15.4*** 14.2*** 15.6*** 10.2*** 
2. Lack of time due to difficult working conditions 15.0***  9.85*** 14.6*** 8.21*** 5.66*** 8.65*** 2.12* 
3. Not liking paperwork 16.2*** 9.85***  10.2*** 1.23 4.80*** .76 12.7*** 
4. Paperwork is not part of my job 18.2*** 14.6*** 10.2***  8.84*** 11.5*** 9.07*** 17.9*** 
5. Not having an adequate reporting system 15.4*** 8.21*** 1.23 8.84***  3.42*** .19 13.5*** 
6. Not knowing what to report 14.2*** 5.66*** 4.80*** 11.5*** 3.42***  4.63*** 8.95*** 
7. Not knowing where or how to report 15.6*** 8.65*** .76 9.07*** .19 4.63***  12.6*** 
8. A difficult or impractical incident form 10.2*** 2.12* 12.7*** 17.9*** 13.5*** 8.95*** 12.6***  
* = ρ < .05, ** = ρ < .01, *** = ρ < .001         
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Appendix 4: Differences between low and high risk organisations 
 
Variable n χ2 Organisation 
   Low Risk High Risk 
   M SD M SD 
Overall Importance ratings       
Positive reasons 568 18.8** 4.88 1.20 4.82 0.98 
Negative reasons 563 2.96 3.83 1.57 3.74 1.48 
Practical reasons 566 7.72 4.39 1.39 4.34 1.23 
       
Positive reasons       
Reporting will result in the problem being fixed 519 15.3** 4.11 1.50 3.71 1.62 
The organisation will learn from my incident 
report 
517 3.61 2.91 1.52 2.94 1.55 
Improvements or changes will occur as a 
result of my incident report 
518 22.4*** 3.32 1.52 3.83 1.21 
Knowing my supervisor will support my 
decision 
514 5.90 1.19 1.49 0.91 1.31 
Knowing my colleagues will support my 
decision 
516 13.1* 0.93 1.41 0.59 1.10 
Knowing management will read my report and 
find it useful 
516 2.30 1.41 1.33 1.45 1.32 
Receiving written feedback on my incident 
report 
517 12.2* 0.75 1.26 0.93 1.23 
Receiving verbal feedback on my incident 
report 
514 7.64 0.69 1.09 0.56 1.04 
       
Negative reasons       
Concerned I might be blamed for the incident 475 27.0*** 2.83 2.01 1.89 1.99 
Concerned about negative performance 
appraisal 
474 10.2 1.46 1.82 1.03 1.64 
Concerns of disciplinary actions or other 
punishments 
474 15.3** 2.01 1.79 1.40 1.73 
Worried about tarnishing company records 475 43.6*** 1.06 1.72 0.26 0.83 
Concerned I could be seen as incompetent 473 5.99 1.77 1.71 1.64 1.80 
Concerns about my reputation or professional 
credibility 
474 5.31 1.56 1.81 1.66 1.77 
Concerns about legal liability or actions 474 2.99 1.70 2.00 1.54 1.93 
Not knowing how the incident report will be 
used 
474 48.0*** 0.71 1.36 1.95 2.05 
Not knowing who is responsible for the 
incident 
476 24.3*** 0.86 1.39 1.42 1.87 
Concerned I could be criticised or teased by 
my supervisor 
473 4.93 0.38 1.08 0.63 1.39 
Concerned I could be criticised or teased by 
my colleagues 
472 11.5* 0.56 1.21 0.59 1.26 
       
Practical reasons       
Lack of time due to high work demands or 
time pressures 
479 12.8* 3.79 1.83 3.93 1.57 
Lack of time due to difficult working conditions 479 4.03 2.34 1.86 2.35 1.84 
Not liking paperwork 479 28.7*** 1.54 1.84 0.81 1.33 
Paperwork is not part of my job 479 48.7*** 0.69 1.29 0.11 0.56 
Not having an adequate reporting system 479 11.6* 0.99 1.50 1.31 1.75 
Not knowing what to report 478 15.4** 1.79 1.73 1.47 1.65 
Not knowing where or how to report 480 2.11 1.17 1.53 1.16 1.57 
A difficult or impractical incident form 479 18.6*** 2.29 1.09 2.80 1.30 
 df =5, Χ² =Chi-Square statistic, * = ρ < .05, ** = ρ < .01, *** = ρ < .001 
 
